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Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves ex
terminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only
the unanimity of the graveyard.1

Since the Warren Court's expansive construction of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, there has been no shortage of
legal scholarship aimed at justifying the remarkably broad protections
afforded the freedom of speech under landmark cases such as
Brandenburg v. Ohio,2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 and Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 4
At the same time, in recent years, a growing chorus of free speech
skeptics have made their voices heard.5 These legal scholars have

* Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A.1987, M.A.
{Philosophy) 1987, Emory; J.D. 1991, LL.M. 1991, Duke. - Ed. I would like to thank Pro
fessors Frank Bowman, Dan Cole, Jeff Cooper, Kenny Crews, Michael Heise, Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Betsy Wilborn Malloy, Gerry Moohr, David Orentlicher, Gary Spitko, Jim
Torke, and Brad Wendel for offering very helpful comments on an earlier version of this
Review. As always, any errors or omissions are mine alone.

1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
2. 395 U.S. 444 {1969).
3. 376 U.S. 254 {1964).
4. 425 U.S. 748 {1976).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?:
HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT {1997); STANLEY FISH,
THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too {1994);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS {1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT {1993); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial In
sults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 {1982); Charles R.
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questioned why a commitment to freedom of expression should dis
place other (constitutional) values such as equality, community, or
citizenship.
This spirited challenge to the Warren Court's free speech ortho
doxy has given rise to a kind of free speech counter-Reformation. De
fenders of the free speech tradition have joined the fray, challenging
those who question the value of racist, sexist, or homophobic expres
sion.6
The debate has taken place against the backdrop of a longstanding
controversy about the "central meaning"7 of the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause. Since Justices Holmes and Brandeis began force
fully applying the Free Speech Clause to provide broad protection to
political speech activity,8 scholars have been deeply divided over the
precise rationale for according speech protection when the speech im
poses significant social costs on the general community. Classic theo
ries of free speech, such as Alexander Meiklejohn's "democratic de
liberation" thesis,9 have competed with newer rationales for protecting
free expression, such as the pursuit of truth, self-realization, or per-

Lawrence III, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Lib
erty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censor
ship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 193 (1996); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484; Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech and
Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1009 (1996) [hereinaf
ter Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review]; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
7. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," l964 SUP. er. REv.191.
8. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) {Holmes, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court formally
embraced the Holmes/Brandeis vision of the First Amendment in Brandenburg and has not
looked back since. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446-49 {1969). But see Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 {1986) {holding that Title VII permits a cause of action
based on a "hostile work environment," an environment that might be created and main
tained through speech activity); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal.
1999) {upholding an injunction against manager's use of racist language, free speech objec
tions notwithstanding); Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995).
9. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF
GOVERNMENT {1948) (arguing that speech should be protected only insofar as it facilitates
democratic deliberation within the community) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH] ;
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment ls an Absolute, 1961 SUP. er. REV. 245
[hereinafter Meiklejohn, The First Amendment]. Harry Kalven continued the Meiklejohn
project, see Kalven, supra note 7, and Owen Fiss carries the torch today, articulating force
fully the democratic-deliberation theory of the Free Speech Clause, see O WEN M. Flss, THE
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); OWEN M. Flss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND TIIE MANY USES OF STATE POWER {1996) [hereinafter Flss, LIBERALISM
DIVIDED] ; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 {1987).
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sonal autonomy.Io Other scholars have suggested more practical ra
tionales for protecting free expression, such as avoiding social disorder
by permitting disgruntled elements of the community to vent their
frustrations peacefully .11
Two recent books, one by Professor Steven ShiffrinI2 and the other
by Professor Stephen Carter,13 propose a renewed focus on protecting
dissent as the central value of the First Amendment. Both works posit
that the government's response to dissent should serve as the key to
evaluating the overall effectiveness of the Supreme Court's free
speech jurisprudence. Professor Shiffrin states his thesis as follows:
"[T]he First Amendment spotlights a different metaphor than the
marketplace of ideas or the richness of public debate; instead, it sup
ports the American ideal of protecting and supporting dissent by put
ting dissenters at the center of the First Amendment tradition" (p.
128). Professor Carter sounds a similar theme arguing that "[c]ivic life
requires dissent because it requires differences of opinion in order to
spark the dialogues from which the community thrives and grows" (p.
16). Carter goes even further, positing that the legitimacy of a gov
ernment's demand of loyalty from its citizens should be a function of
its treatment of those who dissent from its laws and policies: "[T]he
justice of a state is not measured merely by its authority's tolerance for
dissent, but also by its dissenters' tolerance for authority."I4
A dissent-based theory of free speech has a great deal of superfi
cial appeal. After all, who could be against dissent in a society osten
sibly dedicated to permitting freedom of speech? Moreover, the
Supreme Court of the United States has taken great pains to empha
size that facilitating political dissent is a core project of the Free
Speech Clause.Is These observations notwithstanding, there are rea10. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1114 (1984); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.03, at 2-24, 2-25 (1994); Robert
Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517,
1525 (1997) (reviewing Flss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9).
11. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7
(1970); Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and the First Amendment Methodol·
ogy, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 949 (1978).
12.

Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

13.

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law Scho'ol.

14. P. 97; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amend
ment, 72 YALE LJ. 877, 882-84 (1963) (arguing that the First Amendment should facilitate

broad-based participation in government decisionmaking and noting that "[o]nce one ac
cepts the premise of the Declaration of Independence - that governments derive 'their just
powers from the consent of the governed' - it follows that the governed must, in order to
exercise their right of consent, have full freedom of expression both in forming individual
judgments and in fomting the common judgment").

15. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-20 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 758-60 (1985) (plurality opinion); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 680 (1972);

Michigan Law Review

1616

[Vol. 98:1613

sons for skepticism about the federal courts' ability to devise and en
force a viable dissent-based theory of free speech.
First, and perhaps most importantly, there are serious definitional
difficulties associated with determining whether or not speech consti
tutes "dissent." Speech that is hostile to the actions of one branch of
the government might be supportive of the actions of another.16 To a
large degree, "dissent" is in the eyes of the beholder.17 As Professor
Richard Delgado has observed, "[a]lthough Shiffrin, to his great
credit, invented the dissent theory, neither he nor someone else com
parably progressive will be able to dictate the manner in which courts
will apply it.�'18 If citizens engaged in dissent have cause to fear being
marginalized by prosecutors and judges drawn from the majority cul
ture, they would have even more cause to fear being silenced under a
regime that makes full First Amendment protection wholly contingent
on the goodwill of a state functionary possessing the discretion to ap
ply or withhold a talismanic label.
In addition, the social costs of speech activity do not necessarily
track whether speech constitutes "dissent." Indeed, some of the most
potentially disruptive speech activity imaginable at least arguably con
stitutes dissent - activities such as shooting physicians who provide
abortion services or bombing federal facilities.19 Less extreme exam
ples of dissenting expressive conduct include flag burning or the
burning of draft cards.20 One need not even rely on expressive con
duct to illustrate the point: Nazis in Skokie represent a kind of dis
sent, yet the nature and context of this speech activity impose very
high social costs on the community.21 The Supreme Court's rhetoric to
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971); West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 64042 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310-11 (1940).
16. For example, a group of people protesting the Nixon administration's efforts to
avoid delivering Oval Office tape recordings to the Special Prosecutor were "dissenting"
from the Executive Branch's policies, but arguably, cheering on the federal judiciary. See
generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 {1974). Whether such speech constitutes dis
sent depends on whether one views the question from the perspective of the Executive or
Judicial Branch of the federal government. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
17.

See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.

18. Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View ofthe First Amendment, 113 HARV.
REV. 778, 784 (2000) (reviewing DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF

L.
AMERICA).

19. To his credit, Professor Carter openly acknowledges that wholly unacceptable acts
of violence against the community arguably constitute a form of dissent. Pp. 60-61, 73-78,
81-84. Even when government may constitutionally regulate expressive conduct, it may do
so despite its communicative value and not because of it. See United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77, 381-82 (1968).
20. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (flag burning);
burning).

O'Brien,

391 U.S. at 376 (draft card

21. See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th
Cir. 1978), affg 477 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); see also Ameri
can Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-30 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the
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the contrary notwithstanding, much contemporary First Amendment
case law reflects direct cost/benefit analysis of proposed speech activ
ity.Zf As Justice White once put the proposition,
it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been ac
cepted because it may be more appropriately generalized that within the
confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so over
whelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no
process of case-by-case adjudication is required.23

It seems unlikely that the Justices would abandon such an approach in
favor of a more absolute protection for speech activity denominated
"dissent" (even if the definitional difficulties could be overcome,
which is doubtful).
These objections to a dissent-based theory of the First Amend
ment do not, however, undermine the utility of Shiffrin 's or Carter's
efforts. Shiffrin's project constitutes a sustained effort to bring the
free speech apostates (generally scholars of the Left) back into full
communion with the free speech tradition. This is an important proj
ect and should spark debate between the free speech doubters and be
lievers. If the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran Church can
resolve their theological differences and create the promise of a return
to full communion,24 Shiffrin is right to push for a reconciliation be
tween free speech traditionalists and the free speech critics.
Professor Carter's emphasis on dissent serves a very different proj
ect: empowering religious minorities within the larger political com
munity. His work constitutes a sustained plea for more secular citi
zens and policy makers to take seriously the concerns of religiously
motivated dissenters.25 To the extent he suggests that the community,
social costs of speech activity), summarily affirmed,
STEFANCIC, supra note 5, at 8-10, 32-37, 49-56, 126-28.

1001 U.S. 475 (1986); DELGADO

&

22. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-54 (1983) (balancing employee speech on
matters of public concern against the cost of disruption in a government workplace); Tinker
v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509-14 (1969) (balancing student
speech rights against the risk of "material and substantial" disruptions in the school);
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-82 (balancing burden on expressive conduct against achievement of
"important" or "substantial" government objective via a narrow tailoring requirement); see
also Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom ofSpeech, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 671 (1983); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Tran
scending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 141.
23. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982); see also Vincent Blasi, The Patho
85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 485 (1985) ("Of
course, ad hoc balancing has long been an integral feature of first amendment doctrine for
many types of disputes.").

logical Perspective and the First Amendment,

24. See Gustav Niebuhr, Vatican Settles A Historic Issue With Lutherans, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 26, 1998, at Al; Peter Steinfels, After Four and a Half Centuries, Lutheran and Catholic
Officials Affirm a Consensus On an Issue That Sparked the Protestant Reformation, N.Y.
nMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at A13; Charles Trueheart, Faiths Heal Ancient Rifts Over Faith:
Catholics, Lutherans End Doctrinal Dispute, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1999, at Al.
25.

See infra section III.C & Part IV.
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always and unfailingly, owes religious extremists a careful and con
cerned audience, he overstates the case of religiously motivated dis
senters. On the other hand, to the extent that religiously motivated
dissenters seek breathing room from the civil state in order to honor
the dictates of conscience, Professor Carter offers a powerful argu
ment for listening to what the dissenters have to say.
I.

DISSENT AS IDEOLOGY: DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE ROLE OF
DISSENT IN PROGRESSIVE POLITICS

Professor Shiffrin's work represents an effort to give leftists and
progressives - often free speech critics - a reason to rethink their
hostility to the free speech project. He offers both practical and philo
sophical reasons for the doubters to return to the one true church:
(1) "Like it or not, the free speech principle is here to stay" (p. 129).
(2) "[T]here is insufficient reason to suppose that the left acts against its
interests in supporting the free speech principle even assuming that
the principle were laissez-faire .... To the extent that leftist politics
depends on social movements and grassroots protests and activities,
the free speech principle is vital" (p. 125).

For reasons that I will develop more fully below, it is highly unlikely
that the free speech critics will agree to rejoin the free speech congre
gation. Moreover, free speech traditionalists are likely to balk at the
compromises that Shiffrin proposes as an incentive for the free speech
critics to renounce their heresies and embrace the free speech princi
ple.
A. Some Definitional Problems with Shiffrin's Vision of Dissent
Before one evaluates Shiffrin's larger, and ambitious project, one
must first meet and overcome two practical difficulties with Shiffrin's
rather unusual definition of "dissent." The first is definitional and the
second is operational.26
1.

Defining Dissent

Shiffrin defines dissent, in large part, by reference to the identity of
the speaker. "By dissent, I mean speech that criticizes existing cus
toms, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities" (p. xi). Even
Soviet Russia ostensibly embraced constructive self-criticism (samok
ritika);27 accordingly one would be hard pressed to object strenuously
·

26. Frankly, these objections would likely apply to any dissent-based theory of free
speech. In this sense, then, my objections are not unique to Shiffrin's theory.
27. See ELLEN PROPPER MICKIEWICZ, MEDIA AND THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC 49, 67-68
(1981).
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to this baseline proposition, (i.e., so far so good). Of course defini
tional issues abound with this definition of �'dissent" because the con
cept is largely relational. Thus, almost immediately storm clouds be
gin to form on the horizon: "Commercial advertisers, however, are
not dissenters" (p. xii). Tobacco advertising, in particular, merits no
special solicitude under Shiffrin's dissent-based vision of the First
Amendment. Thus, it would seem that, under Shiffrin's theory, large
corporate entities, such as tobacco companies, cannot engage in dis
sent even if they 9ppose, the views of either the government or the
general community. Dissent, for Shiffrin, appears to be the exclusive
prerogative of disempowered cultural minorities who are victimized
by the hierarchy and racism of the contemporary United States. Sim
ply put, corporations need not apply. Corporate speech might have
some communicative value, "but it does not deserve the full value that
should be afforded to more classic instances of dissent."28

2.

Excluding Speakers Based on Viewpoint

One might think that reactionary groups, like the Ku Klux Klan or
John Birch Society, would fit the "more classic" paradigm of dissent.
One would be mistaken. Although "[t]he Ku ;Klux Klan would also
claim to be dissenters, social outcasts who challenge the foundations of
the system ... the Klan arguably silenGes those who would otherwise
be dissenters" (p.xii). Accordingly, "a focus on dissent in this context
would not offer clear-cut guidance - which perhaps helps to explain
why many see the hate speech issue as a difficult problem" (p. xii).
Racist dissent "should be not a case for celebrating our glory as a na
tion but an occasion for shame" (p.xiii)..

3.

Dissent in Service ofIdeology

As this preliminary analysis shows, Professor Shiffrin's conception
of dissent is rather one-sided. The flag-burning Gregory Johnson pre
sents a paradigm of dissent; he is entitled to the broadest protections
afforded under the Free Speech Clause (pp. 10-11). This is so because
"[i]f we must have a 'central meaning' of the First Amendment, we

28. P. xii. Professor Shiffrin does not attempt to distinguish between corporations en
gaged in commercial speech and noncommercial speech: "I think it better to make decisions
about the general category without resort to ad hoc decisions within it." P. 41. Theoreti
cally, one could distinguish between corporations attempting to sell a product and corpora
tions attempting to contribute to the process of democratic deliberation. Compare First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating a statute that prohibited
corporations from making expenditures to influence vot�rs) with Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (invalidating a regulation that
banned a utility from advertising to promote use of electricity). Although the Supreme
Court has recognized this distinction, Professor Shiffrin does not place any reliance upon it
when developing his dissent-based model of free speech. See, e.g., p.119.

1620
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should recognize that the dissenters - those who attack existing cus
toms, habits, traditions, and authorities - stand at the center of the
First Amendment and not at its periphery" (p. 10). Once one moves
from a disaffected leftist burning a flag to a disaffected rightist
preaching race hatred, however, Shiffrin's commitment to dissent
seems considerably weaker.
For Professor Shiffrin, dissent serves the ends of progressive poli
tics by empowering cultural and political minorities to challenge "in
justice." "The dissent model assumes that in large-scale societies
powerful interest groups and self-seeking politicians and bureaucrats
are unavoidable" (p. 17). In consequence, "[d]issenters and the dia
logue that follows will always be necessary" (p. 17). "The value of dis
sent, then, in this context is not that it fosters individual development
or self-realization, or even that it exposes injustice and brings about
change" (p. 18). Rather, it is a kind of "cultural glue" that binds the
political community together. This is all well and good until we learn
that this "cultural glue" does not provide any adhesive value to right
wingers and corporate entities that are engaged in speech activity op
posing official government policies that enjoy broad-based community
support.
In the context of commercial speech, Professor Shiffrin submits
that "[c]ommercial advertisers are not dissenters" (p. 41). Because
commercial advertisers "encourage people to consume products that
cause needless death and suffering" (p. 48), they cannot assume the
mantle of dissent.29 Here, we see the strongly content-laden conceptu
alization of dissent that Professor Shiffrin proposes:

Tobacco advertising is not an instance of the individual striking out
against the current. Instead, it is an example of the powerful influencing
the market rather than one of dissent by the less powerful. Tobacco ad
vertising is no part of a social practice that challenges unjust hierarchies
with the prospect of promoting progressive change. Thus, it may have
some First Amendment value in the dissent mold, but it does not deserve
the full value that should be afforded to more classic instances of dissent.
[pp. 41-42]

29. Some of these conclusions appear related to Professor Shiffrin's assumption that
government enjoys a relatively free hand in regulating commercial speech. Pp. 33-37. For
better or worse, Professor Shiffrin's efforts at prognostication have failed. Although it is
true that Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 {1986), and Edge
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 509 U.S. 418 {1993), supported some of his assertions about government
regulation of commercial speech, more recent cases indicate quite clearly that the tide has
turned in favor of affording commercial speech remarkably broad First Amendment protec
tion. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923 {1999); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 {1993). With each passing term, the Jus
tices seem to be moving closer and closer to the position that commercial speech enjoys the
same measure of First Amendment protection as noncommercial speech. See Alex Kozinski
& Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 {1990).
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This is a remarkable limitation on the scope of dissent, not just for
commercial or corporate speakers, but for any person or entity whose
speech fails to "challenge[] unjust hierarchies with the prospect of
promoting progressive social change" (p. 42).
This ideologically
bound definition of dissent invites legislators and judges alike to pick
free speech winners and losers based on both the identity of the
speaker and the viewpoint of the speaker.30
Unfortunately, this is not an aberrational statement. A few pages
later, Shiffrin reports that "[t]he dissent perspective would argue that
policies, prescriptions, and privileges of the elite need to be challenged
on a regular basis by enough people to make a difference" (p. 45).
Again, Shiffrin is openly associating dissent with a particular set of
partisan or ideological outcomes. It is difficult to take such a theory
very seriously, for it openly invites government censorship of disfa
vored speakers (i.e., "elites," corporate entities such as tobacco com
panies, and Neanderthal right-wingers spouting racist messages).31 In
deed, this model of the dissent perspective has more in common with
contemporary free speech jurisprudence in the People's Republic of
China32 than in the United States:

30. Ironically, Professor Shiffrin faults Professor Owen Fiss and other devotees of Pro
fessor Alexander Meiklejohn's democratic deliberation model of free speech for inviting
judicial personnel to make subjective decisions about whether speech activity encourages or
facilitates democratic deliberation. Pp. 19-22. Shiffrin argues that, under the Fiss model,
"[j]udges would be deciding on an ad hoc basis which issues need to be discussed on the na
tional agenda and which have been comparatively marginalized." P. 20. Yet, if judges face
such difficulties in deciding whether speech enhances or debases democratic deliberation,
are they going to have any easier time deciding whether particular speech activity constitutes
"dissent"? Moreover, Shiffrin's exclusion of corporate and right-wing speakers from his
model of "dissent" embraces the exact sort of judicial subjectivity that he faults Fiss for em
bracing. Professor Shiffrin cannot have it both ways: either judges are capable of fairly ex
ercising discretion, or they are not.
31. Indeed, if taken to its logical extreme, under Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory, the
Republican Party and its candidates might not merit the broadest protections of the First
Amendment to the extent that the party's platform fails to "challenge unjust hierarchies" (at
least as defined or understood by Professor Shiffrin). After all, the Republican Party plat
form opposes abortion on demand, supports minimalist government, opposes the welfare
state, and generally supports tax relief for corporations and upper-income taxpayers - all
policies unlikely to fit Shiffrin's definition of "dissent." Were the federal courts to embrace
Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory, to the extent one opposes change, insufficiently advocates
"progressive" change, or supports "hierarchy" of "the elite," one could claim only a reduced
share in the protections afforded by the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.
32. See XlANFA [Constitution] art. 3 (1982) ("Citizens of the People's Republic of China
enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of dem
onstration."); id. art. 51 ("The exercise by citizens . . . of their freedoms . . . may not infringe
upon the interests of the state, of society, or of the collective."); cf. Erik Eckholm, A Quiet
Roar: China's Leadership Feels Threatened By a Sect Seeking Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1999, at AlO; Seth Faison, Followers of Chinese Sect Defend Its Spiritual Goals, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1999, at A4; Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Reportedly Detains 2,000 Members of Falun
Gong Sect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at Al4; Cindy Sui, Falun Gong Holds Jail Hunger
Strike; Sect Members Resist China's Crackdown, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2000, at A17.
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[w]hen legislatures seek to regulate the speech of the powerful on
grounds of political equality, a dissent perspective would not suggest that
the courts should pull out a rubber stamp. On the other hand, courts
should be generous in assessing such regulations because the legislature
seeks to advance important constitutional goals. [p. 47]
Thus, dissent is the exclusive prerogative of a speaker "challenging the
insensitive exercise of power by a person she believes is carrying hier
archy to excess," and "not a corporation hawking its wares or seeking
to dominate the election process" (p. 48).
This, of course, begs contemporary political reality. Tobacco com
panies are in full retreat, and smokers are an increasingly marginalized
and disfavored subgroup within the community. California has en
acted taxes on the sale of tobacco products, with a portion of the reve
nues generated used to fund advertising campaigns aimed at destroy
ing the market for tobacco products.33 This principle of "tax and
destroy" raises serious general First Amendment problems; if gov
ernment may tax an entity to subsidize government speech aimed at its
ultimate destruction, government essentially can monopolize the mar
ketplace of ideas.34 A tobacco company engaged in speech activity
protesting this arrangement seems squarely in the role of dissent and,
moreover, would be defending important generic free speech princi
ples.35

33. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30,121-30,130 {West 1994) {also known as "Propo
sition 99"); Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 806 P.2d 1360, 1362-67
{Cal. 1991) (upholding constitutionality of Proposition 99); see also RICHARD KLUGER,
ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTES AR 703-05 {1996); Paul A.
LeBel, "Of Deaths Put On By Cunning and Forced Cause": Reality Bites the Tobacco
Industry, 38 WM . & MARYL. REV. 605, 635-47 {1997) {reviewing STANTON A. GLANTZ ET
AL., THE CIGARETIE PAPERS (1996), PHILLIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN {1996), and
KLUGER, supra). Massachusetts and Arizona followed California's lead, enacting schemes
taxing tobacco products and using the funds to provide health care services and also adver
tising campaigns aimed at driving smoking out of existence. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
42-3251 to -3253 {West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 2xx {Supp. 1999); ch. 64C, § 7C
{1998).

w

34. See EMERSON, supra note 11, at 697-716; MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: PoLmcs, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA {1983); John E.
Nowak, Using the Press Clause to Limit Government Speech, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 {1988);
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 589-95 (1980); William W. Van
Alstyne,

The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the
United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530 (1966); Edward
H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship,
21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 614-17 {1980); Jay S. Bloom, Comment, Unconstitutional Government
Speech, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 815 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advo
cacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535 {1980); Mark V. Tushnet,
Talking to Each Other: Reflections on Yudofs When Government Speaks, 1984 WIS. L.
REV. 129 {book review); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). But cf.
Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) (stating that government officials can legiti
mately be expected to express the views of the majority of their constituents).

35. See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L.
589 {1996); see also Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good For
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Turning to racist speech, Professor Shiffrin straightforwardly re
jects hate speech as an integral member of the dissent family. "In my
view, the argument that First Amendment values (such as truth,
autonomy, self-expression, and liberty) dictate that racist speech can
not be regulated is ultimately indefensible,' (p. 50). Given the exclu
sion of commercial speech from the universe of "dissent," this is
hardly a surprising move. Shiffrin ultimately questions the utility of
hate speech regulation, not because such regulations violate the First
Amendment, but rather because "the racist character of our society"
probably would make such regulations ineffective at protecting the in
terests of racial and cultural minorities (pp. 50, 80-86).
In Shiffrin's view, hate speech should not be protected "to safe
guard the liberty of the speaker or because it is valuable" (p. 85). Be
cause "dissent" is intrinsically valuable and lies at the heart of the First
Amendment, a careful reader must conclude that hate speech, in Shif
frin's view, does not constitute "dissent." The government should not
proscribe such speech only because "American society may be so
thoroughly racist that nontargeted racist speech regulations would be
counterproductive" (p. 85). Shiffrin takes pains to emphasize that if
his cost/benefit analysis proves to be wrong, "I would presently sup
port punitive measures against public instances of racial vilification
even when not targeted against individuals. "36
Plainly, Professor Shiffrin's viewpoint-based definition of dissent
leads to some deeply counterintuitive results: although both Ward
Connerly and Clarence Thomas are members of a historically disem
powered racial minority, they arguably are not engaged in "dissent"
when they take positions that do not combat "injustice" or "challenge
unjust hierarchies" (at least as some would define those terms).37
Likewise, although David Duke and Matthew Hale espouse racist
viewpoints rejected by most citizens,38 they too are not engaged in dis
sent because their speech potentially silences disempowered minori
ties. Presumably, minorities who espouse racist or anti-Semitic view
points, such as Louis Farrakhan or Leonard Jeffries, also are not
"dissenters."
General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory ofFree Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 235 (1998).

36. P. 85. In addition, Professor Shiffrin endorses providing tort remedies to the victims
of targeted hate speech. Pp. 80-87, 161 n.161.
37. Of course, Mr. Connerly and Justice Thomas undoubtedly would claim that their
professional efforts are aimed precisely at "challenging unjust hierarchies" and facilitating
"progressive" change. Professor Shiffrin's strongly left-leaning definitions of "progress" and
"challenging hierarchy" are contestable and undoubtedly would be contested if his dissent
theory ever gained any ground in the federal courts.
38. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text; see also Christi Parsons, White Separa
tist Denied Law License, CHI. TRm., Feb. 9, 1999, § N, at 1 (describing the Illinois Bar Asso
ciation's decision to refuse admission to Matthew Hale because of his support of racist view
points and organizations, including the World Church of the Creator).
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Historically, the Supreme Court has placed viewpoint neutrality at
the very core of the First Amendment.39 Government attempts to take
sides based on a speaker's position on a given issue of the day are pre
sumptively unconstitutional.40 Even when speech is otherwise pro
scribable, government may not pick and choose among speakers based
on viewpoint.41 Shiffrin's vision of the First Amendment does not ap
pear to be viewpoint neutral, because a speaker's ability to claim the
full protection of the First Amendment is, at least in some circum
stances, contingent on the substance of the speaker's message. Nor is
his definition of dissent speaker neutral - a speaker's characteristics
might define whether or not she (or it) can lay claim to the strongest
protections of the First Amendment. For example, no matter what the
issue, commercial enterprises cannot engage in dissent.42
This certainly represents a new twist on First Amendment theory.
Governments historically have cared less about the identity of a
speaker than the content of a speaker's message. Hence, in the early
part of the twentieth century, a person advocating the necessity of a
proletarian revolution faced official censorship and punishment for
advocating such ideas.43 More recently, those espousing views sympa
thetic to Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism have faced persecution for
their ideological commitments.44 The identity of the speaker was quite

39. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 {1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414-1.6 {1989); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 {1982) {plurality
opinion); Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 {1959); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340U.S. 268, 271-73 {1951).
40. See Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 {1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 {1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S 116, 132, 136-37
{1966); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMO CRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 1113, 167-71, 239-40 {1993).
41. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505U.S. 377, 382 {1992); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 n.20 {1996); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 878-80
{1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
42. Consider, for example, Benetton's recent and controversial advertising campaign
featuring death row inmates. See Stuart Elliot, Benetton Ads Offer Tour ofDeath Row, N.Y.
nMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at CB; Hank Stuever, Radical Chic: Benetton Takes On the Death
Penalty, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2000, § C, at 1. Although Benetton undoubtedly wishes to
sell clothing, it is difficult to understand why this speech activity should not be deemed "dis
sent." Cf. p. 41 {"There is a serious question whether judges should be asked to make ad
hoc decisions about whether particular advertisements are or are not dissenting. I think it
better to make decisions about the general category without resort to ad hoc decisions within
it.").
43. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 {1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
{1925); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 {1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
{1919). Even celebrated labor leaders fell victinl to the government's censorial appetites.
See Debs v.United States, 249U.S. 211 {1919).

44. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 {1967); Barenblatt v.United States, 360U.S. 109 {1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354U.S. 234 {1957); Dennis v.United States, 341U.S. 494 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341U.S. 123 {1951).
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irrelevant to the analysis; membership in a particular social or cultural
minority would not affect the outcome of a case. Eleanor Roosevelt
stood on the same First Amendment ground as Marcus Garvey or J.
Edgar Hoover.
A speaker-based theory of the First Amendment seems deeply
problematic. As a practical matter, if the United States is as pro
foundly racist as Shiffrin suggests (pp. xii-xiii, 76-87), it is difficult to
imagine police, prosecutors, courts, and jurors applying a speaker
based vision of the First Amendment in a just fashion (although some
might suggest that the task itself is inherently unjust). One might
think that, assuming Shiffrin's assertions about the unremittingly racist
nature of the contemporary United States are true, the opportunity to
make vindication of speech rights contingent on the identity of the
speaker would leave minority culture speakers less well off than they
are under current First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the proj
ect of viewpoint neutrality is meant to ensure that unpopular speakers
are not censored simply because the speaker's message offends the
dominant forces within the community. Speech regulations must be
viewpoint neutral precisely because police, prosecutors, judges, and
jurors are highly likely to hold strong preexisting opinions about the
proper ordering of the community. To counter this trend, reviewing
courts require the government to censor all speakers or censor none.
Moreover, with respect to public property, the government may cen
sor speakers only through viewpoint neutral, reasonable time, place,
and manner regulations45 and, with respect to private property, the
government may proscribe speech only when the speech raises a clear
and present danger of imminent lawlessness.46
B.

More General Problems with a Dissent-Based Model
ofFree Speech

Even if one were to reject Shiffrin's troubling definition of dissent,
a more generalized dissent-based model of the First Amendment
would still present serious operational difficulties. Whether speech
constitutes dissent is a highly subjective matter. Suppose, for example,
that a street protestor supports a national missile defense but opposes
the deployment of the Patriot missile? Is such a person engaged in
dissent against the government's defense policies, or is such a person
effectively supporting the government? Undoubtedly, different peo
ple would characterize the speech in divergent ways, depending on

45. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491U.S. 781, 791 (1989); United States v. Grace,
461U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Hague v. CIO,
307U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
46. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
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whether they viewed the Patriot missile as an essential component of
the government's defense program.
It really should not matter whether the speech effectively supp orts
or opposes contemporary government defense policy. If the s peech
relates to an issue of public concern about which the government must
establish and enforce a policy, then the speech should enjoy the most
robust protection that the First Amendment can afford.47 Judges
should not attempt to engage in a preliminary characterization of the
speech as "dissent" or "non-dissent" to determine the burden on the
government in suppressing the speech activity.48
The problem of identifying dissent is infinitely more difficult than
this preliminary analysis would suggest. The "government" is not a
monolithic entity. For example, the Reagan Administration opp osed
the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade49 and consistently urged
the Supreme Court to overrule this precedent. On the anniversary of
Roe, President Reagan regularly spoke, via telephone, at a pro-life
rally held in Lafayette Park, directly across the street from the White
House.50 The protestors opposed the Su preme Court's ruling in Roe,
viewing it as a condonation of murder, a position embraced by the Ex
ecutive Branch of the federal government (through the Department of
Justice and the President himself).51 Were these pro-life protestors

47. See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 9, at 22-27; Emerson, supra note 14, at
882-86; Kalven, supra note 7, at 205-13.
48. One might suggest that any speech the government seeks to suppress constitutes dis
sent. Although this definitional fix has some superficial appeal, it really would not solve the
problem. Government regulations regarding the use of public property for speech activity
are often generic- whether one can use a particular park or street for speech activity is not
contingent on the message one seeks to propagate. See Clark v. Community For Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). Accordingly, limitations on speech activity might well
apply to persons wishing to support some aspect of government policy.
49. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
50. See Ruth Marcus & Victoria Churchville, Antiabortion March Nears; Protestors Ar
rive By the Busload, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1985, at Al; Ruth Marcus & Steven Heilbronner,
"Reagan to Address Abortion Foes, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1985, at Al; Robin Toner, Rally
Against Abortion Hears Pledge of Support By Reagan, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1987, at AlO
[hereinafter Toner, Rally Against Abortion]; Robin Toner, Reagan Exhorts Foes ofAbortion
at Capital Rally, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1986, at D25 [hereinafter Toner, Reagan Exhorts]. Af
ter succeeding President Reagan, President Bush continued the Reagan Administration's
abortion policies. See Steven V. Roberts, "Nominee of Bush's ls Said to Oppose Banning
Abortion, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1989, at Al:
Mr. Bush pleased opponents of abortion today when he spoke by telephone to a rally pro
testing the Roe v. Wade decision and made one of his strongest statements to date on the
highly emotional issue. "I know there are people of good will who disagree, but after years
of sober and serious reflection on the issue, this is what I think. .. . I think the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade was wrong and should be overturned."

51. At various times, President Reagan vowed to "end this national tragedy," Toner,
Rally Against Abortion, supra note 50, and pledged to "continue to work together with
members of Congress to overturn the tragedy of Roe v. Wade," Toner, Reagan Exhorts, su
pra note 50. Moreover, Reagan emphasized that the Executive Branch had decreased the
incidence of abortion by "restrict[ing] the use of Federal funds to perform abortion" and by
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engaged in dissent, or merely supporting the position of the federal
government? The answer depends on whether or not one views the
question from the perspective of the federal judiciary rather than the
Oval Office.
Undoubtedly, protecting dissent is an important function of the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
routinely has indicated that this is so.52 Accordingly, Shiffrin' s desire
to build a free speech framework on the construct of dissent is per
fectly understandable. Given the definitional and operational difficul
ties, however, dissent is better protected through a project of strict
viewpoint neutrality.
Because of the potential for bias in any system of free speech pro
tection contingent on the characterization of speech by government
officials, requiring that all speech be treated equally serves as a far
better means of effectively protecting dissent than a theory that invites
would-be government censors to make the protection of speech to
some degree contingent on a label easily withheld because of antipa
thy toward the message (or the messenger). Prohibiting the govern
ment from officially taking sides on questions of the day and then si
lencing all opposition best ensures that contrary voices are heard.
Take, for example, anti-abortion protesters. It is difficult to
imagine a viable dissent-based model of the First Amendment that
would not encompass this group. Survey data show that a clear ma
jority of U.S. citizens believe abortion should be legal, at least in some
circumstances.53 At the same time, a substantial plurality of citizens
view unborn fetuses as possessing personhood from conception and,
therefore, the destruction of a fetus as a form of murder.54 President
Clinton and Congress, unsurprisingly, have sided with the majority,
enacting laws that, as applied by some federal and state courts, se
verely restrict the ability of anti-abortion protesters to engage in
peaceful anti-abortion protests outside abortion clinics.55 The federal
"den[ying] Government funds to organizations overseas that perform or promote abortion."
Toner, Rally Against Abortion, supra note 50.
52 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
53. See Carey Goldberg & Janet Elder, Public Still Backs Abortion But Wants Limits,
Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al; Andrew M. Greeley, How Do Catholics Vote?:
Not As Pawns of the Church, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1984, at E21. Father Greeley reports
that even clear majorities of Roman Catholics do not oppose abortion under all circum
stances. See id.
54. See Goldberg & Elder, supra note 53; see also Pamela Constable & John W.
Fountain, Abortion Foes in Grim Profusion: Protest Marks 25th Anniversary ofRoe v. Wade
Decision, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1998, at Bl.
55. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat.
694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)). Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have sus
tained the Access Act against First Amendment challenges. See American Life League, Inc.
v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55
F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
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judiciary generally has blessed this legislation and endorsed the crea
tive use of injunctions to restrain protestors who are communicating
messages to women attempting to enter and leave abortion service
providers.56 In short, the full power of the federal government has
been brought to bear against pro-life, anti-abortion protestors who
wish to demonstrate outside abortion clinics.
Whether or not one agrees with the pro-life movement's assertions
about the nature of unborn human fetuses, these protestors are plainly
engaged in a form of dissent. Moreover, this dissent is highly un
popular, in part because of the crude methods often utilized by the
anti-abortion protestors (e.g., the use of graphic depictions of aborted
fetuses and other ghastly props in making their point). Shiffrin never
mentions anti-abortion protestors as a model of dissent. Indeed, given
his speaker- and viewpoint-based limitations on what constitutes "dis
sent," it is far from certain that they would even meet his definition.57
Of course, one might object that it is also far from certain that the
protestors will fare any better under the viewpoint-neutrality project.
A law that prohibits all persons from engaging in speech activity
within so many feet of an abortion clinic restricts the speech activities
of all persons without regard to their viewpoint on abortion. This ig
nores the reality that pro-life demonstrators are far more likely to en
gage in protest activity outside abortion clinics than pro-choice activ
ists. The facially neutral restriction cuts more deeply against one side
of the debate, and does so quite intentionally in consideration of the
rights of those seeking to enter and leave family planning clinics.58
This does not demonstrate the failure of the viewpoint-neutrality
project so much as the failure of the federal judiciary to apply First
Amendment principles to a group of very unpopular protestors who
engage in discourse that is highly offensive to many persons within the
community. In any event, it does not seem likely that anti-abortion
protestors would fare any better under a free speech regime vesting
56. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519
U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 479-88 (1988); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999); see also Lawson v.
Murray, 119 S. Ct. 387 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of cert.); Williams v. Planned
Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.); Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of cert.).
57. Suppose that the anti-abortion protestors were all heterosexual, upper-middle class,
caucasian males, employed by a non-profit corporation whose officers oppose abortion on
demand (for example, priests and lay members of the Roman Catholic Church). Given that
this group does not suffer the ill effects of the pervasive racism and patriarchy Shiffrin be
lieves to plague the contemporary United States, a district court judge utilizing Shiffrin's dis
sent theory might well deny the protestors the full protection of the First Amendment.
58. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions ofSpeech Because of Its Content: The
Peculiar Use of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 100-15 (1978) (arguing

that subject matter restrictions, although facially neutral, often mask official antipathy to
ward particular messages and speakers and, therefore, should be viewed skeptically).
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judges with the ability to pick and choose speakers based on either the
content of their messages or the demographic and economic makeup
of their groups.
C. Shiffrin's Defense and Its Shortcomings
Shiffrin anticipates the objection that his theory is viewpoint, and
perhaps speaker based: "To be sure, some might accuse my analysis
of tracking my political preferences too closely, so that left-wing dis
senters get protected while people I do not like (corporations and
right-wingers) do not" (p. 129). This disclaimer appears on the penul
timate page of the book and scarcely recalibrates the preceding 128
pages, in which Shiffrin consistently defines "dissent" in terms of the
ideological perspective of the speaker: dissent constitutes speech ac
tivity by the less powerful challenging the more powerful to redress
"injustice" (rather a value-laden concept, not to put too fine a point on
the matter) (pp. xi-xiii, 10-12, 17-18, 20, 41-42, 45, 47-48, 75-76, 80, 85,
91-93, 112, 120). Having consistently defined the free speech project
in value-laden, ideological terms, a disclaimer on the next to the last
page really does not present much of a counterweight.
Nevertheless, Professor Shiffrin maintains: "In an important
sense, however, this accusation is wrongheaded. Rules under my ap
proach are fashioned to protect dissent without regard to the politics
of the dissenters" (p. 129). This simply is not so, at least with respect
to openly racist speakers like Matthew Hale and the World Church of
the Creator:
Because both aggressors and victims can be characterized, with some ac
curacy, as dissenters, the dissent story underscores the difficulty of the
First Amendment status of racist speech. On the one hand, the dissent
perspective seeks to protect those with popularly disdained views and, in
an important respect, this includes those who publicly express racist
views. On the other hand, the dissent perspective seeks to assure that
those who are out of power or lower in a hierarchy have the means to
protest their status and to combat the inevitable abuses of power by
higher-ups. A regime that is blind to the importance of assuring that dis
advantaged groups are not intimidated will contain, as its status quo, sub
stantial corruption and abuse. [p. 77]
Plainly, Shiffrin is saying that Matthew Hale and David Duke are
not entitled to the same level of free speech protection as Jesse
Jackson or Hillary Rodham Clinton. Just in case there might be doubt
about this, Shiffrin later emphasizes that "my contention should be
clear. I am not arguing that racist speech should be protected to safe
guard the liberty of the speaker or because it is valuable" (p. 85). As
to the Ku Klux Klan, for instance, "the Klan says in public what many
millions of white individuals think or come close to thinking in pri
vate" (p. xii) , hence the Klan's message is, at best, a redundancy.
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Moreover, the Klan "silences those who would otherwise be dissent
ers" (p. xii) . In consequence, "a focus on dissent in this context would
not offer clear-cut guidance" (p. xii) , meaning that the Klan's speech
activities do not constitute "dissent" for purposes of Professor
Shiffrin's theory of the Free Speech Clause.
Nor is Professor Shiffrin's objection to censoring racist speech re
lated to "a chilling effect in the marketplace of ideas (though some
marginally valuable speech could be lost); nor . . . the vagueness of
working out standards case by case (though vagueness is of course not
a virtue)" (p. 85). Thus, dissenters who oppose workplace speech
regulations, or affirmative action programs, or equal civil or political
rights for racial minorities are outside Shiffrin's dissent-based model of
the First Amendment - their opposition to the existing status quo
may be discounted, because it is offered in support of a political
agenda inconsistent with Shiffrin's notions of redressing "injustice."
Indeed, such speech can be seen as seeking to increase the frequency
of racial injustice in the United States.
Racist dissent merits protection only because efforts to eradicate
such speech through government regulation might backfire. Shiffrin
tells us that "[i]f I thought such regulation would be effective on bal
ance in combating racism, I would presently support punitive meas
ures against public instances of racial vilification even when not tar
geted against individuals" (p. 85). He limits this proposal only by
noting that he would abandon this position if "[p]eople of color . . .
think that the tangible benefits of deterrence and the symbolic impor
tance of this legislation outweigh the speculative possibilities of non
deterrence, evasion, and increased racial hostility; that, in short, the
advantages of taking a stand outweigh the costs."59
Given Shiffrin's absolute exclusion of racist speech from his con
cept of "dissent," one must conclude that, his assertion to the contrary
notwithstanding, his theory of free speech is viewpoint-based. A
viewpoint-neutral, dissent-based theory of the First Amendment

59. P. 85. One wonders how a federal district court judge would go about ascertaining
the answer to this question. After all, it seems doubtful that all members of a given racial
minority group would share identical views on the desirability of hate speech regulation such a proposition is highly essentialist. See Carter, p. 69 ("Now, you might have noticed my
use of the term 'black community.' Let me make clear that I do not claim - and I do not
believe - that there exists an identifiable set of black 'meanings,' as there often is, for ex
ample, in a religious community; that is, I do not believe in the existence of such a thing as
the 'black point of view.' "). Moreover, it also seems likely that different racial minority
groups might have different attitudes about hate speech regulation. Does Shiffrin mean
that, if a bare majority of a given racial group supported hate speech regulation, it should be
deemed both constitutional and desirable? What about those who dissent from this point of
view within the minority group? The problem seems hopelessly complex and, therefore, the
suggestion that government simply should defer to the wishes of racial minorities is not par
ticularly helpful. Cf. Carter, p. 69 ("So I am not in that sense an essentialist, and I quiver
whenever smart professors who should know better assert that there is a unique 'black per
spective' (which they, of course, are uniquely able to identify).").
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would extend the strongest protections of the Free Speech Clause to
all speech in opposition to existing government programs and policies
- even if the opposition seems terribly wrongheaded, misguided, or
hate-inspired. Such dissent merits protection not because the general
community derives substantial benefits from these proposals, but be
cause a government empowered to silence racist dissenters is equally
empowered to silence progressive dissenters.60
Indeed, given Shiffrin' s repeated assertion that "American society
may be so thoroughly racist that nontargeted racist speech regulations
would be counterproductive" (p. 85), not to mention his earlier asser
tion that "our country is racist to the core" (p. xiii), one wonders why
he would trust the presumably racist government to enforce hate
speech codes in a fair and even-handed fashion. Professor Nadine
Strossen has reported that Canada's experiment in regulating "de
grading" erotic speech has not stopped the flow of "mainstream" het
erosexual pornography into the country, but has led to the censorship
of gay and lesbian erotica.61 Simply put, the average male, heterosex-

60. Shiffrin's doctrinal defense of hate-speech regulation also merits a brief mention.
Professor Shiffrin mounts an extended attack on both Justice Scalia's majority opinion and
Justice White's concurring opinion in R.A. V. v. City ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). Pp. 5176. His basic objection rests on the idea that existing free speech jurisprudence already
makes a number of important distinctions based on the content of speech activity. Pp. 57-58.
Citing to commercial speech cases, Shiffrin argues that "point-of-view" discrinlination is a
permissible feature of government speech regulation in some circumstances and, given this
state of affairs, _regulations subjecting racist points of view to civil or crinlinal liability should
be sustained against First Amendment objections. P. 57-63. Later on, Shiffrin shifts his
ground and characterizes Justice Scalia's objection to the St. Paul ordinance as a problem
involving content discrinlination. See pp. 57-67. Essentially, Shiffrin uses the concepts of
"point-of-view" discrinlination and "content discrimination" interchangeably. Of course,
viewpoint-based discrinlination and content-based discrinlination are not the same thing.
A local ordinance permitting candidates for public office - but not commercial adver
tisers - to place signs on utility polls owned by the city would constitute content discrimina
tion. Contemporary free speech jurisprudence generally permits government to regulate
different kinds of speech activity differently, although this is not universally the case. See,
e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419-21, 430-31 (1993)
(striking down a ban on commercial news racks, noting blurred distinction between com
mercial and other speech); William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some
Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1638-48 (1996) (noting a
recent trend to treat commercial speech like any other speech). Viewpoint-based discrimi
nation, on the other hand, picks and chooses free speech winners and losers within a par
ticular kind of speech activity. For example, a municipal ordinance permitting Proposition
200 supporters to place signs on city-owned utility polls but denying the same permission to
Proposition 200 opponents would constitute viewpoint-based discrinlination. The govern
ment would be picking a preferred point of view from within the marketplace of ideas and
advancing this viewpoint through its sovereign powers. R.A. V. involved an ordinance that
mandated both viewpoint-based discrinlination and content discrinlination. See R.A. V., 505
U.S. at 391-95. This makes all the difference in the world for purposes of free speech analy
sis.

61. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND
THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 234-44 (1995); see also Mary Williams Walsh, Chill Hits
Canada's Porn Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al (describing government raid of a les
bian bookstore).
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ual Canadian customs agent does not find Penthouse or Hustler unduly
offensive (or "degrading") but does find Robert Mapplethorpe's pho
tographs sufficiently "degrading" to justify official government sup
pression.
Shiffrin never comes to terms with the inherent contradiction of
ositing
a society that devalues and disrespects cultural and political
p
minorities with a free speech doctrine that invites the state to pick free
speech winners and losers. To be fair, his defense of free s peech
against postmodern critics rests on the idea that marginalized political
groups obtain needed breathing room through the exercise of free
speech rights. "To the extent that leftist politics depends on social
movements and grassroots protests and activities, the free speech
principle is vital" ( p. 125). In the absence of the free speech principle,
"government could squelch antiwar protesters and civil rights protes
tors. "62 The problem is that Shiffrin's refusal to credit right-wing and
corporate s peech activity as dissent opens up the very real possibility
of government censorship of liberal or progressive speech activity.63
Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly recognizes these seeds of contradic
tion in his argument. His project is not so much to convert the free
s peech absolutists, but the free s peech critics coming from the New
Left.64 By attempting to marginalize the free speech prerogatives of
reactionaries and corporations, he makes the free speech principle po
tentially more attractive to the postmodern critics. This is, of course, a
difficult tightrope to walk.65

62. P. 125; see also Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705 (1969); Bond v. Flogel, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
63. See STROSSEN, supra note 61, at 222-24 (describing the widespread use of hate
speech regulations to silence racial minorities and women for speech critical of the dominant
culture). Professor Strossen reports that, under the University of Michigan speech code,
"there were more than twenty cases of whites charging blacks with racist speech." Id. at 223.
Moreover, "the only two instances in which the rule was invoked to sanction racist speech
(as opposed to other forms of hate speech) involved punishment of speech by or on behalf of
black students." Id.; see also Strossen, supra note 6, at 506-07, 556-59 ("The general lesson
that rules banning hate speech will be used to punish minority group members has proven
true in the specific context of campus hate speech regulations."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Res
urrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 987 (1995) ("Using the state to change cul
ture before power in an unequal world can often backfire, for example, if speech codes are
applied to students of color, or antipornography laws to gay erotica."). But cf. Lawrence,
supra note 5, at 450 n.82 (arguing that hate speech regulations should not be applied to pro
tect members of the "dominant majority groups").
64. See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
65. Evidently, at least one member of the Critical Race Theory movement has been en
ticed by Professor Shiffrin's efforts to vest a greater share of the First Amendment's stock
with cultural minorities favoring progressive causes. See Delgado, supra note 18, at 779
("Steven Shriffin's Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings ofAmerica is a welcome addition to
this emerging 'First Amendment legal realism' vein of scholarship.").
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D. The Social Costs ofSpeech Activity Do Not Necessarily Track
Viewpoint or Content

Even if the considerable definitional difficulties could be overcome
successfully, a dissent-based model of the First Amendment would still
not work. To put the matter plainly, the social costs of speech activity
do not necessarily correlate with whether the speech constitutes "dis
sent" (however defined). Indeed, the bombing of the Oklahoma City
federal building arguably constituted the most powerful statement of
dissent in the last decade. To that, one might add Theodore
Kaczynski's mail bomb letters to the purveyors of technology and the
anti-abortion zealots' murders of abortion clinic personnel.66
Shiffrin might respond that acts of violence do not constitute
speech activity, but rather criminal conduct, and therefore do not con
stitute dissent.67 Fair enough. The point still remains that the groups
most likely to engage in dissent also impose some of the highest costs
on the community.
Consider, for example, Matthew Hale and the World Church of
the Creator. Hale and his church preach a brand of white supremacy
that is highly destructive of building and maintaining a viable plural
istic community.68 Indeed, his racist tracts motivated Benjamin Smith
to go on a multi-state rampage, murdering two minorities and
wounding nine others in the process.69
The official policy of the United States government is to promote
and secure the full civil rights of all persons. The policy appears in
myriad federal laws and regulations and enjoys the support of all ma66. For a list of the physicians and staff members murdered and wounded since 1993,
see Michael A. Fletcher, Sniper Kills Abortion Doctor Near Buffalo, WASH. POST, Oct. 25,
1998, at Al. Since Dr. David Gunn's murder on March 10, 1993, in Pensacola, Florida, anti
abortion protestors have killed five additional clinic personnel and wounded yet another
five. See id. "Since 1977, there have been over 1,700 attacks against abortion providers, ac
cording to the National Abortion Federation." Id.
67. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
68. See Rosemary Radford Ruether, How Did the Creator Become A White Racist?,
18, 1999, at Cl?; Kirsten Scharnberg, A Gospel of Hatred, CHI. TRIB July
11, 1999, at Cl. Professor Ruether believes that, rather than affording racist churches a re
spectful hearing, Christians of good will
CHI. TRIB ., July

.,

need to take responsibility for more mainstream patterns of thought that feed racist extrem
ism: namely belief in a God who ordered creation as a hierarchy that sacralizes the power of
dominant groups over others, who favors some nations and religions against others and who
mandates war and violence as a way to establish God's reign on Earth.
69. See Edward Walsh, Midwest Gun Spree Suspect ls Dead, WASH. POST, July 5, 1999,
at Al; Edward Walsh, Racial Slayer Killed Himself in Struggle, WASH. POST, July 6, 1999, at
Al; see also Eric Bailey, 2 Brothers Indicted in Synagogue Fires, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000,
at Al9 (describing the various acts of terror James Tyler Williams and Benjamin Matthew
Williams have committed against Jews, racial minorities, and homosexuals, including arson
and murder, all in the name of maintaining and enforcing "biblical law").
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jor political parties. No serious mainstream person in contemporary
American politics advocates conditioning the civil rights or liberties of
citizens on race. Consequently, Hale and his followers have placed
themselves in opposition to the official position of the government;
they are engaged in dissent.
Whether or not courts openly admit the practice, they routinely
engage in utilitarian cost/benefit analyses when deciding free speech
claims.70 Hence, indecent erotic speech enjoys less First Amendment
protection than a candidate's stump speech under the theory that the
community reaps greater benefits from the latter than the former and,
accordingly, the government enjoys less of an ability to restrict politi
cal speech than non-obscene erotica.71
Some of the most costly speech activity constitutes dissent.72 This
does not necessarily mean that government should enjoy a relatively
free hand in censoring the speech of unpopular political minorities,
but it does suggest that the problem of hate speech requires more than
simply determining whether or not the speaker is engaged in dissent
and, if so, letting the speaker have his say.
In fact, Shiffrin largely abandons his focus on dissent when dis
cussing the problem of hate speech. In rather direct terms, he advo
cates a kind of utilitarian calculus in determining whether or not to tax
the costs of such speech activity against the community in order to fa
cilitate the speech activities of hate mongers: "The basic problem with
the autonomy argument [in favor of protecting hate speech] is that it
cannot show that the value of individual autonomy outweighs the
harm caused by racist speech" (p. 79). Shiffrin also questions whether
"the idea of respect for persons demands any particular weighing of
the competing values in this context," and concludes that "[a]ny confi
dence that the value of free speech in this context outweighs the harm
requires placing a thumb on the scales" (p. 79).

70. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (carving out an exception
to the Miller obscenity test in order to allow regulation of child pornography). But cf. Blasi,
supra note 23, at 485 ("The realistic goal must be to contain such balancing, not eliminate it;
even Justice Black recognized in disputes over the timing and location of demonstrations an
appropriate sphere for a case-by-case judicial comparison of communicative and regulatory
interests.").
71. Compare Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), and City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991),
and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
72. See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 916, 916-19 {1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from de
nial of cert.) (giving the history of the Skokie case, which involved a Nazi march through a
Jewish community); see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Re
calibrating the Cost ofHarm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1165 {2000); Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and
Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 {1982) (reviewing ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING
MY ENEMY {1979)).
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This practical cost/benefit analysis makes a great deal more sense
than application of a reflexive "dissent protected speech" calculus.
Because the social costs of hate speech are so great, courts should
weigh carefully whether the benefit to the project of democratic delib
eration justifies absorbing the corrosive effects of hate speech.73 As
Professor Richard Delgado has put the matter, "A realist approach
would regard both · individual and social costs and benefits as daily
weighing in the balance."74 In consequence, such a theory "would deal
with both the effects of hate speech on the life of a single individual as
well as its impact across large groups."75
In this regard, it bears noting that virtually all Western democra
cies have adopted hate speech codes - including Canada, France, and
Germany. Those nations have performed the cost/benefit analysis and
concluded that the potential harm associated with hate speech out
weighs its potential social value. Thus, in Canada, a candidate calling
for a race war would find himself in jail, not on the ballot.76
Given the consensus in other industrial democracies, that hate
speech constitutes a social harm worthy of proscription, Shiffrin's utili
tarian approach has much to recommend it. He also reaches a defen
sible result: hate speech should be protected not because it is intrinsi
cally socially valuable, but rather, because government is incapable of
fairly administering a speech code. Rather than using the rhetorical
shell of "dissent," Shiffrin would have advanced his case more con
vincingly if he simply had made a direct argument for social
cost/benefit analysis in contemporary free speech jurisprudence.77
=

II.

DISSENTING FROM SHIFFRIN'S VISION OF DISSENT

Even a sympathetic reader will find it difficult to overlook a fun
damental objection to Professor Shiffrin 's theory of the First Amend73. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307-08 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The
vulnerability of various forms of communication to community control must be propor
tioned to their impact upon other community interests."); see also Beauhamais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a criminal conviction based on Beauhamais distributing rac
ist leaflets on the streets of Chicago, Illinois, under an Illinois statute prohibiting group li
bel).
74. Delgado, supra note 18, at 789.
75. Id.
76. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319 (1985); Canadian Human Rights Act,
R.S.C., ch. H-6, § 13 (1985); Regina v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; In re Keegstra, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 697, 744-49; WF Party v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN
GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. 40, at 231, U.N. Doc. No. A/38/40 (1983); see also Kathleen E.
Mahoney, The Canadian Constitutional Approach to Freedom ofExpression in Hate Propa
ganda and Pornography, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1992); Kathleen E. Mahoney,
Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction ofFreedom ofExpression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
789, 792 n.17, 804-05.
77. See Delgado, supra note 18, at 785-91.
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ment: Shiffrin's unrelentingly ideological definition of the dissent
based free speech project. For Shiffrin , dissent is not about demo
cratic deliberation, or personal autonomy, or any of several other well
established theories of free speech. Instead, "dissent" constitutes
criticism of the existing social structures by select members of disgrun
tled cultural minorities seeking to slay "hierarchy" and "injustice" in a
quest to achieve fundamental social change (of a sort consistent with
progressive/radical ideals of government):
Dissent attacks existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, and
authorities. It spies injustice and brings it to light. This does not mean
that dissent is always effective; indeed, much dissent does little to bring
about effective change. Nor is dissent always fair. It may often be dis
torted by envy of those higher up in a particular hierarchy. . . . For all its
occasional faults, dissent is indispensable. Without it, unjust hierarchies
would surely flourish with little possibility of constructive change. If the
truth about the presence of injustice is to be spread, social institutions
must be constructed in a way that nurtures critical speech. [p. 93]
This conceptualization of dissent, although undoubtedly welcome by
those who question the importance of speech relative to equality or
community,78 runs strongly against the grain of prevailing free speech
norms.
A. Dissent Comes from Across the Ideological Spectrum
The problem, obviously enough, is that much contemporary dis
sent involves what "progressives" may view as implicitly encouraging
or embracing racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, or homophobic attitudes and
behaviors; even more dissent explicitly seeks to preserve "existing cus
toms, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities" (p. 93) in the face
of powerful erosive forces. Simply put, there is no reason to suppose
that dissent, as a social phenomenon, unfailingly redounds to the sup
port of liberal or radical candidates, policies, or causes. Shiffrin's con
ceptualization of dissent is, at best, highly romanticized and, at worst,
hopelessly muve. It is probably true that "we are a long way off from
a society that is committed to encouraging dissent in an effort to com
bat injustice" (p. 112). That said, it seems far from clear that more dis
sent necessarily will advance the cause of social justice. It is just as
conceivable that reactionary forces might carry the day.79
78. See Delgado, supra note 18, at 782-95.
79. Certainly, the recent trend in favor of state initiatives banning or prohibiting volun
tary affirmative action efforts would suggest that dissent from existing government policies
does not always redound in favor of positions supported by liberals or progressives. It also
would be a mistake to assume that state governments support the passage of such anti
affirmative action initiatives. This was certainly not the case in Washington State, where
virtually every state-wide elected officer from the Governor on down actively campaigned
against the passage of Initiative 200. See Sam Howe Verhouek, In a Battle Over Preferences,
Race and Gender Are at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998, at Al. Thus, supporters of Initia-
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For persons who subscribe to Holmes's marketplace of ideas
metaphor or to Meiklejohn's conception of free speech80 as a neces
sary incident of the project of democratic self-government, who wins
or loses the debate is far less important than the fact of the debate it
self.81 Shiffrin comes dangerously close to suggesting that freedom of
speech is the exclusive prerogative of one segment of the community
- liberals, progressives, and radicals. Given the lack of electoral suc
cess of such persons in recent times, one might well ask whether a the
ory of the First Amendment that invites viewpoint or speaker-based
government censorship will redound to the benefit of Shiffrin's pre
ferred class of speakers.82
Of course, Professor Shiffrin does not absolutely condition First
Amendment protection on speech constituting dissent. Vague refer
ences to the protection of "political speech" and "commercial speech"
exist in the text - although the reader is left at sea as to precisely
what these protections should be (p. xii) . Shiffrin' s enthusiasm for
free speech is plainly focused on a particular subset of speech that ad
vances a specific ideological vision for the community; those who fail
to advance that agenda, such as tobacco companies or the purveyors
of alcohol, appear to be left at the gate (pp. 41-42).
When tobacco companies espouse radically unpopular opinions at
substantial variance from the existing policies of the government, it is
difficult to understand why a federal court concerned for dissent
should withhold the full protection of the First Amendment. After all,
most theories of dissent are positional: one defines dissent in relation
to the existing policies and practices of the community. Hence, in a
state like California with fairly draconian public smoking statutes, a
tobacco company or restaurant owner seeking the repeal of such laws
to permit customers to smoke on the restaurant's premises would be
dissenting from the official policies of the government, policies that
enjoy the support of a contemporary majority of California voters.

tive 200 were positioned in opposition to the established political hierarchy in Washington
State (i.e., they were dissenters).
80. See supra note 9 and accompanying text
81. As Justice Holmes explained, "[e]very idea is an incitement," and "[e]loquence may
set fire to reason." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, the process of democratic deliberation does not guarantee any particular ideo
logical outcome: "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are des
tined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way." Id.
82. As Shiffrin himself notes, pp. 121-22, many scholars of the Left have abandoned
both free speech and rights talk, more generally, as social structures that tend to reify rather
than challenge existing social, economic, and political conditions. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The
Phenomenology ofRights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L.
REV. 1563 (1984); Robert A. Williams Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and
Promise of Critical Legal Theory for People ofColor, 5 LAW & INEQ. 103 (1987).
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Similarly, during the Prohibition years,83 the liquor industry found it
self in the position of dissenting from the official policies of the federal
and state governments (an effort that finally bore fruit with the adop
tion of the Twenty-first Amendment).84
"The dissent perspective would argue that the policies, prescrip
tions, and privileges of the elite need to be challenged on a regular ba
sis by enough people to make a difference" (p. 45). It is difficult to
fathom precisely what this means, or how a federal district judge
would go about implementing this mandate. "Elite" positions on
questions of the day are far from self-evident. Do elites favor or op
pose abortion on demand? How about school vouchers that may be
used at pervasively sectarian primary and secondary schools? Should
federal courts commission polling data or appoint the Gallup Organi
zation as a special master to determine which viewpoints merit robust
First Amendment protection and which do not? It is difficult to dis
agree with Shiffrin that "[p]rotection for dissent is a necessary feature
of any respectable democracy" (p. 45), but I am not at all sure that any
respectable democracy could embrace Shiffrin's definition of dissent
while claiming to maintain more than a mere theoretical commitment
to the freedom of political speech.
Professor Shiffrin seems to recognize that problems might inhere
in implementing his dissent-based vision of the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, he suggests that courts should accord progressive speech
regulations broad deference. "[C]ourts should be generous in assess
ing such regulations because the legislature seeks to advance impor
tant constitutional goals" (p. 47). If a particular regulation represents
an imperfect solution to the problem of empowering the marginalized
voices within the community or silencing the voices of corporations, so
be it. "Regulations designed to secure justice in the polity need not be
perfect. Justice should not be delayed because non-viable alternatives
are conceivable" (p. 47). Shiffrin admonishes that "[a] dissent-based
approach proceeds from a moral condemnation of unjust hierarchies
wherever they may be inside or outside of government - whether or
not they relate to 'public issues' �' (p. 48).
An unsympathetic reader might ask precisely who will identify the
"unjust hierarchies" in order to sustain otherwise impermissible view
point or speaker-based speech regulations. Presumably, this task will
fall upon some official within the government, perhaps a judge or
prosecutor. If one accepted Shiffrin's suggestion that the United
States "is racist to the core" (p. xiii), and dominated by "elite" per
spectives, it is difficult to understand how his theory of free speech
could be successfully implemented absent an intervening revolution.
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XX!.
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Because persons holding significant positions of power undoubtedly
would be selected with great care and sophistication by the evil elites
calling all of the shots, is there really any reason to believe that these
officials would embrace more than superficially a theory of free
speech that privileges their mortal enemies while silencing their dear
est friends? There is, thus, a certain amount of inconsistency in the
theory between the continued state supervision of speech, the guide
lines supposedly directing such supervision, and the underlying as
sumptions about authority's willingness to obey such guidelines - as
sumptions that created the need for progressive dissent in the first
place.
In this regard, consider the case of Missouri Supreme Court Justice
Ronnie White. The United States Senate refused to give its consent to
Justice White's appointment to the U.S. federal district court in St.
Louis, Missouri, allegedly because he was "pro-criminal" and "activ
ist. "85 The evidence supporting this characterization largely consisted
of Justice White's voting record in death penalty cases - he had the
temerity to vote to reverse death sentences in approximately thirty
percent of the cases that had come before him.86 For this perceived
failure of judgment, the Senate voted to reject his nomination on a
straight party line vote of fifty-four Republicans voting against the
nomination versus forty-five Democrats voting in favor of the nomina
tion. Justice White's story is but a single part of a larger phenomenon:
women and racial minorities have greater difficulty obtaining confir
mation in the contemporary Senate than do heterosexual white men.87
If a majority of the Senate is prepared to reject a nominee for reg
istering dissent from his colleagues on ultimate matters of life and
death, it seems unlikely that the Senators will prove more willing to
embrace judicial nominees who register political dissent on other con
troversial issues, such as drug policy. The implications for a dissent
based theory of free speech should be clear: If Justice Ronnie White
cannot engage in principled dissent when matters of life and death are
at stake without rendering himself unfit for federal judicial office, is it
really plausible to think that the "system" would tolerate officials who
consistently reach out to protect highly unpopular, marginalized dis
senters, thereby affording them the broadest protections of the First
Amendment's free speech guarantee? If contemporary American so-

85. See Charles Babington & Joan Biskupic, Senate Rejects Judicial Nominee, WASH.
POST, Oct 6, 1999, at Al (describing the circumstances surrounding the Senate's rejection of
the nomination and quoting Missouri GOP Senator John Ashcroft as describing Justice
White as "pro-criminal" and "activist").
86. See id.
87. See Ben White, Deepening Rift over Judge Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1999, at A3
(describing the Senate's higher rejection rate for minority judicial nominees than for nonmi
nority nominees during the Clinton administration).
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ciety suffers from as many racial, gender, and class biases as Professor
Shiffrin suggests and elected officials fairly and accurately implement
the wishes of their constituents, there is not much cause to be optimis
tic about these questions. Indeed, Justice White's experience suggests
that the price of registering dissent can be staggeringly high, even
when the underlying policy position at issue enjoys broad support
within a plurality of the community.
The abject failure of campaign finance reform provides another
cautionary note for any dissent-based account of free speech. In
Buckley v. Valeo,88 the Supreme Court accepted the proposition that
money equals speech and protected unlimited direct spending to elect
or defeat a particular candidate.89 Moreover, the Buckley Court also
embraced a financing scheme for presidential elections that effectively
institutionalizes the Democratic and Republican parties, a system that,
moreover, hobbles independent and third-party presidential candi
dates.90 Despite widespread alienation and cynicism about the con
temporary electoral process, there appears to be little hope for secur
ing meaningful campaign finance reform anytime soon. Even if the
Supreme Court were to rethink its "speech equals money" logic, it is
doubtful that incumbent members of Congress would act against their
own collective self-interests by enacting meaningful campaign finance
reform in order to empower political dissenters. In this fashion, then,
candidates who wish to bring nontraditional programs or platforms be
fore the American public systematically are disfavored (and thereby
silenced).91
Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly would agree with this description of
the current state of electoral affairs, but probably would argue that the
proper response is swift adoption of meaningful campaign finance re
form legislation (pp. 111-12). This begs the fact that we have not ar
rived in our present situation by mere happenstance. The system
marginalizes and silences dissent not by accident, but by design.92 Nei
ther the Democratic nor Republican parties are likely to embrace any

88. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
89. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 12-23, 39-59; see also Burt Neubome, Toward a
Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055-62,
1071-73 (1999) (critiquing the Buckley decision and offering up rationales for sustaining

comprehensive campaign finance reform legislation).
90. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-108; cf. id. at 290, 291-94 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the public funding provisions "enshrined the Re
publican and Democratic Parties in a permanently preferred position, and has established
requirements for funding minor-party and independent candidates to which the two major
parties are not subject").
91. See Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2478-82 (1997).
92. For an extended discussion of the relationship between wealth and free speech, see
Free Speech and Economic Power: A Symposium, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1053 (1999).
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program of reform that disserves their short and long term institu
tional interests.93
To the extent that dissent presently does not seem to enjoy any
special call on executive, legislative, or judicial consciences, making all
speech claims contingent on a subjective label bids fair to legitimate
greater, not less, suppression of politically marginal speakers. Thus,
absent some revolutionary change in government (which seems, at
best, highly unlikely), a system of free speech protection focused pri
marily on dissent likely would have the perverse effect of further sti
fling meaningful opposition to existing governmental and economic
policies and institutions.
The related problem of ascertaining precisely what constitutes
"injustice" also exists. Throughout his work, Professor Shiffrin em
phasizes the importance of dissent to combating successfully "injus
tice." Describing the proper mission of the public schools, he argues
that
our educational system must educate not only autonomous thinkers pre
pared to reject the habits, customs, and traditions of the larger society
but also citizens who generally regard dissent against injustice as virtuous
behavior. . . . For example, students in large and small groups could be
assigned projects of challenging injustices they collectively perceive
within their local communities. [pp. 113-14]
Such activity should be encouraged because "[t]he practice of chal
lenging injustice should not only instruct them in the present but also
encourage them to do so in the future" (p. 114). This is all well and
good, so long as one leaves undefined the scope and content of "injus
tice." Once a teacher, principal, administrator, or school board mem
ber begins attempting to identify "injustices" within the community,
things are likely to get very complicated very quickly.
Shiffrin is undoubtedly correct to suggest that injustices exist
within our society at the national, state, local, and neighborhood level.
The problem, of course, is that in a diverse and pluralistic society with
myriad ideological, religious, and social traditions and commitments,
one person's injustice is another person's tradition.94 It is not at all
clear that having the government attempt to identify and define "in
justice" for purposes of applying the First Amendment's Free Speech

93. See JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 44-47, 86-105 (1997) (describing public choice theory, the idea
that legislators, given a free choice, systematically will make decisions that advance their
own perceived self-interest, with particular attention to the problem of federal campaign fi
nance reform).
94. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The War ofthe Worlds: A Few Comments on Law,
Culture, and Rights, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 379, 379-83 (1997); Leslye Amede Obiora,
Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against
Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 275, 278-79, 332-45, 371-78 (1997).
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Clause represents a sound jurisprudential approach to vindicating free
speech claims.95
B.

The Measure of Dissent

Professor Shiffrin has undertaken an incredibly difficult task: he is
attempting to square postmodern free speech critiques with a revised
and renewed liberal free speech tradition. Rather than simply admit
ting defeat for the liberal conception of free speech and ceding the
field to the CLS, Critical Race Theory, Feminist Jurisprudence, and
Law & Sexuality critics, he attempts to construct a multi-cultural and
postmodern theory of free speech that relocates free speech as a bul
wark for the protection of oppressed and marginalized cultural minori
ties. Instead of entrenching the position of existing elites, Shiffrin's
vision of the First Amendment would make the Free Speech Clause a
powerful weapon for dispossessed political and cultural minorities to
challenge what they perceive to be "injustice."
His definition of dissent demonstrates his commitment to this
project: it is viewpoint and speaker-:based precisely because a view
point and speaker-based approach is essential to meeting and refuting
the critique of the Left. By vesting the strongest protections the Free
Speech Clause has to offer with the strongest critics of the post
Brandenburg tradition, he hopes to create a free speech paradigm that
is acceptable to all. Shiffrin's project is incredibly ambitious, and he
deserves a great deal of credit for the strength and power of his argu
ments. One also should note that he self-consciously embraces the
role of agent provocateur: "I am trying to open a dialogue rather than
provide the last word" (p. 112). His effort at reconciling the free
speech tradition with the critique of the New Left is terribly important
if the social consensus in favor of free speech as a preferred value is to
be maintained. In other liberal democracies, when these values come
into conflict, the social commitment to free speech has given way in
the face of demands that adequately securing values associated with
equality and community be given a higher priority than protecting free
speech.
Professor Shiffrin argues that "there is insufficient reason to sup
pose that the left acts against its interests in supporting the free speech

95. For example, the government of South Carolina does not seem to view the contin
ued display of the Confederate battle flag over the state capitol building "unjust," even
though many African-American South Carolinians seem to so view the matter. See David
Firestone, 46,000 March on South Carolina Capitol to Bring Down Confederate Flag, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2000, at A14; Bob Herbert, In America: OfFlags and Slurs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 2000, at Al9. If minorities in South Carolina cannot convince the state government to
remove an emblem long-associated with racist causes from the seat of state government,
should they have any confidence that state functionaries would credit their efforts to engage
in dissent combating other forms of injustice?
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principle even assuming· that the principle were laissez-faire" (p. 125).
Free speech facilitates grass-roots organizing and protest, which chal
lenges the status quo and facilitates reform; accordingly, liberals, pro
gressives, and radicals should embrace free speech (pp. 124-27).
Viewed through this prism, the free speech principle "has a strong po
litical tilt against the unjust exercise of power" (p. 128). Moreover,
" [l]ike it or not, the free speech principle is here to stay" (p. 129). As
a matter of political pragmatism, progressives and radicals should ac
knowledge that " [it] is better political strategy to claim it than to hold
out oneself as an enemy of a cherished right" (p. 129). Thus, if argu
ments based on principle do not convince, a frank appeal to practical
political considerations might get the job done. If neither approach
succeeds, try to scare the free speech apostates back into the fold with
the prospect of damnation: a sustained attack on free speech "prom
ises to guide the left into outer darkness" (p. 130).
The New Left is badly divided on the value and importance of free
speech to the progressive cause. A growing number of critics reject
rights talk in general96 and the value of free speech in particular.97
Thus, Shiffrin' s project represents a sustained and cogent effort to
bring the free speech schismatics back into· the fold.
Ultimately, however, even Justice Brennan, the great conciliator,
would not have been able to reconcile these contending factions. Free
speech traditionalists are certain to object to Shiffrin' s effort to make
the identity of the speaker - not to mention the content of the
speaker's message - an important component in determining the
First Amendment status of speech activity. This aspect of the program
rends asunder the viewpoint-neutrality project, an essential tenet of
the traditional First Amendment faith.
Free speech critics also are unlikely to be convinced.98 Shiffrin has
attempted to give them a greater stake in the First Amendment by
vesting disempowered cultural minorities with enhanced claims to free
speech protection. So long as the instrumentalities of government re
main in the majoritarian hands, however, the critics will not be satis
fied. 99 After all, even if cultural minorities enjoyed some greater call

96. See Gabel, supra note 82; Joel F. Handler, Postmodemism, Protest, and the New So
cial Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 697, 707 (1992); Robert Williams, supra note 82, at
114-21. But cf. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Decon
structed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404-06 (1987); Williams, supra note 82, at
121-34.
97. See Delgado, supra note 5, at 140-41; Andrea Dworkin, Pornography ls a Civil
Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55 (1987/88); Mari Matsuda, Lecture, in
Alan Borovoy et al., The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Language as Violence vs.
Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37
BUFF. L. REV. 337, 360 (1988/89).
98. But see Delgado, supra note 18, at 782-87, 795-98, 802.
99. See E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator
From Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. REs .
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on the Free Speech Clause, the contingency of this claim on courts
staffed overwhelmingly by members of the majority would breed in
tense skepticism (with some good cause).100
C. Enhancing Democratic Deliberation in the Name of Dissent
It would be a mistake, however, to disregard Shiffrin's call for a
renewed dialogue about the centrality of dissent to the free speech
project. Even if one contests his definition of "dissent" and his insis
tence that "dissent" consistently seeks to overcome "injustice," his
proposals for facilitating improved public deliberation have great
merit and deserve serious consideration.
Shiffrin is surely correct to suppose that the Free Speech Clause
should facilitate dissent from disaffected individuals and groups within
the society. Moreover, many of his proposals for enhancing the role
and visibility of dissent within the body politic are quite sensible. Pro
fessor Shiffrin suggests four broad reform projects that might improve
the quality and quantity of public deliberation:
Any society that encouraged dissent would have to meet four conditions:
(1) its system of public education would need to promote attitudes and to
teach skills that would assist in creating a substantial body of citizens
with the talent and the will to challenge injustice in appropriate circum
stances; (2) channels of communication for expressing dissent would
need to be open; (3) legal barriers to dissent would need to be held to a
minimum; an (4) social and governmental institutions would need to be
designed to make information available to those who wish to dissent.
[pp. 112-13]

L. REV. 275, 286-90 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming]; E. Gary Spitko,
He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the "Reasonable Het
erosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 81-89 (1997); E. Gary Spitko, Judge
Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065, 1067-69, 1072,
1075-77 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Judge Not]. Professor Spitko's utter distrust of majori

tarian adjudication of the legal rights of cultural minorities in the public courts has led him to
call upon cultural minorities to establish their own, quasi-private courts through voluntary
arbitration. See id. at 1077-83; Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra. Although he has
never written on First Amendment doctrine, I strongly suspect that he - and others like him
- would object strongly to any free speech theory that potentially vests judges and juries
with more, rather than less, discretion because, in his view, such discretion inevitably will
come to be exercised consistently in a fashion that marginalizes cultural minorities. To the
extent that data on the question exist, it does seem to support such fears. See Spitko, Gone
But Not Conforming, supra, at 278-86.
100. See Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 99; Spitko, Judge Not, supra note
99. As Dean Kathleen M. Sullivan has explained:
Thus, I believe that a number of the new arguments for speech regulation with a post
modern twist have a massive non sequitur at their core. Why trust the state - the very
source of some of the bad, old social structures - to get the new ideology right? There
might be strong reasons to distrust the state in reordering our ideological preferences, even
if we trust it to solve other problems in our collective life.

Sullivan, supra note 63, at 987.
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Each of these proposals not only would advance a dissent-based vision
of the Free Speech Clause, but also would advance the project of
democratic deliberation more generally. In this sense, then, one wed
ded to a different operational paradigm for the Free Speech Clause
might still agree with the substance of Professor Shiffrin' s program of
reform.
It would be difficult to disagree with Professor Shiffrin's assertion
that the public schools should prepare students for active participation
in the life of the community. Given the apathy and lack of participa
tion by young people in contemporary electoral politics,101 it would
appear that the schools are failing to foster in the nation's youth a
spirit of civic duty and a corresponding obligation of participation in
the project of democratic self-government. To be sure, the task of
preparing young Americans for participation in our democracy does
not fall solely on the shoulders of teachers and school administrators.
Nevertheless, the apathy of younger citizens toward the electoral pro
cess at all levels of government is a problem102 that the schools should
address. As Professor Shiffrin puts it, "an educational system commit
ted to producing active citizens with a sense of justice can produce a
more active citizenry" (p. 113). Undoubtedly, "in educating for de
mocracy in public and private realms, our schools could do more to
encourage dissent."103 Were they to do so, perhaps young citizens
would be less apathetic about actively participating in the project of
self-governance.
101. See LINDA J. SAX ET AL., AMERICAN FREsHMAN: NATIONAL NORMS FOR FALL
1997, at 2-4 (1997); Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, Current Status, and
the Future, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1433-35 (1999); see also Richard Harrington, Giving a Rap
About Voting, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1992, at Fl ("Since 1971, young people's voting partici
pation has declined with each presidential election {36 percent in 1988)."); Rene Sanchez,
College Freshmen Have the Blahs, Survey Indicates; Academic, Civic Apathy Reach Record
Levels, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1998, at Al (reporting on minimal interest of entering college
freshmen in civic participation, with "[o]nly about 17%" expressing interest in " 'influencing
the political structure' " and a mere 21 % indicating that they regularly vote in student elec
tions); Rene Sanchez & Audrey Gillan, Outnumbered, Outvoted, Out of Clout on the Hill,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at Al ("Some analysts say the percentage of young adults who
vote in presidential elections, which has never been high but showed new signs of growth in
1992, tumbled below 30% last year.").
102. See Panel Discussion: Civic Education, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1451, 1459, 1462 {1999)
(reporting that only 20% of young adults voted in the last federal election and warning that
"[t]he participation of young people in voting and other forms of civic association appears to
be in a free-fall. We can expect the lowest voting turnout yet among 18-to-25-year-olds in
the next presidential election."); Steven A. Holmes, The Melting Pot Politics of 2000 Are
Truly Soupy, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2000, § 4, at 1 ("Despite efforts like MTV's 'Rock the
Vote,' young people continue to be among the most politically apathetic groups in the coun
try.").
103. P. 114. Ironically, students currently enjoy very limited free speech rights on cam
pus and, therefore, their opportunity to engage in dissent is more apparent than real. See S.
Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs - Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer
of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 120-21 (1995) (noting that "core political
speech is no more protected in the public schools than a dirty limerick scrawled in a bath
room stall").
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Professor Shiffrin's second reform proposal deals with access to
the media (pp. 115-17). He criticizes broadcasters for caring too much
about maximizing profits and too little about facilitating democratic
deliberation (including, of course, dissent) (pp. 115-17). His sugges
tions for improving the mass media's contribution to public discourse
include increasing candidate access to the media, creating opportuni
ties for the public to access media outlets to communicate their ideas
with the larger community, and a renewed commitment to non
commercial broadcasting (pp. 116-17). All of these proposals would
materially improve the process of democratic deliberation in this
country and should receive serious consideration.104
Professor Shiffrin's failure to address the Internet as a potential
platform for dissent is puzzling. Although television broadcasters and
cable system operators presently deliver programming to mass audi
ences on a more reliable basis than the Internet, technological changes
will chip away at the existing broadcast media's monopoly on mass
audiences. Accordingly, the need to ensure accountability from
broadcasters and cable system operators may .be reduced as the Inter
net makes programming, content-on-demand a reality.105 This is not to
say that established media cannot or should not do a better job of fa
cilitating democratic deliberation. Rather, their continuing failure to
take action may be less important over the long term than Shiffrin
suggests.
Professor Shiffrin also proposes reforms aimed at reducing the op
portunity costs (pp. 117-18) and transaction costs (pp. 118-20) associ
ated with engaging in dissent. Again, even if one were to dispute or
reject Professor Shiffrin's definition of "dissent" as unduly limited, his
proposals for reducing the potential liabilities associated with speech
activity on matters of public concern would enhance the ability of av
erage citizens to participate in the project of democratic deliberation.
In other words, limiting the liability associated with engaging in public
debate and enhancing the access of average citizens to the means of
participating in public debate would be wise policies under any plausi-

104. Having previously endorsed many of the same proposals, I hardly can be heard to
object to Shiffrin's call for a renewed commitment by the mf1SS media to facilitating the proj
ect of participatory democracy. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcast
ers, Bureaucrats, and Children's Television Programming, 45 DUKE LJ. 1193, 1236-48 (1996);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of
Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2134-38 {1997) (book
review) [hereinafter Krotoszynski, The Inevitable Wasteland].
105. There might still be a need for government-subsidized educational programming in
the age of the Internet. Although the Internet will provide a platform for delivering pro
gramming content to a mass audience, one must still hire writers, producers, and actors to
create the content. The history of public access cable stations suggests that providing a plat
form for the delivery of programming content will not ensure a reliable supply of high qual
ity programming. See Krotoszynski, The Inevitable Wasteland, supra note 104, at 2128-29.
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ble conception of free speech in a democratic society.106 As with the
proposals associated with broadcasting, one wonders why Professor
Shiffrin does not explore the possibilities of the Internet for facilitat
ing democratic deliberation and dissent. Although broadcast media
remain critically important to the process of elections and public de
bate, new media are going to play an increasingly important role in
democratic deliberation. A reform program aimed at securing regula
tions that promote the dissent-enhancing possibilities of the Internet, a
relatively new medium for mass communication, might possess greater
potential for success.107
Professor Shiffrin is right to challenge the legal community to think
creatively about ways in which to secure greater and more representa
tive public participation in the project of democratic deliberation. In
the end, Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly is correct to assert that with
respect to encouraging public participation in self-government: "[w]e
can do better. We cannot do enough" (p. 120).
III.

D ISSENT IN THE SERVICE OF THE LORD: RELIGIOUSLY
MOTIVATED DISSENT AND THE- SECULAR STATE

Professor Stephen Carter, like Professor Shiffrin, presents a
dissent-based model for conceptualizing the freedom of speech. And,
like Shiffrin, Carter has a particular set of speakers in mind when ar
guing that dissent should play a greater role in contemporary political
debate. "Mainstream politics, with its arrogant rejection of religious
argument and traditional religious values, has alienated tens of mil
lions of voters, and by no means are all of them hard-line conserva
tives" (p. 9). Carter's thesis is an elaborate argument in favor of tak
ing religiously motivated dissent more seriously.
Invoking traditional Enlightenment conceptions of the state,
Carter argues that a government retains its legitimate claim to the al
legiance of its people only so long as it remains responsive to their
needs, wants, and desires (pp. 7-19). Traditionally, these ideas are ex
pressed in the maxim that just governments derive their legitimacy
from the consent of the governed, a consent that is ongoing and freely
given.108 Professor Carter suggests modifying the maxim by placing
greater emphasis on the government's responsiveness to the dissent of
the governed (pp. 4-7). Invoking language in the Declaration of Inde106. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defaml]tion & Discourse in Cyber
space, 49 DUKE LJ. 855, 860-65, 876-83 (2000).
107. See id. at 892-904, 944-46.
108. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES ON
G OVERNMENT 'll'll 89-94, 95-99, 123-31, 134-42, 211-43 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1690); JEAN
JACQUES ROSSEAU, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER
PoLmCAL WRmNGS 48-54 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans. 1997) (1762).
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pendence complaining that "[o]ur repeated Petitions have been an
swered only by repeated Injury,"109 Carter argues that legitimacy
should be as much a function of how a government responds to dissent
as it is about creating and sustaining programs that enjoy broad ma
joritarian support:
Perhaps governments - good and fair ones anyway - do not after all
derive their powers from the consent of the governed. Perhaps they de
rive their powers instead from the dissent of the governed. For the fair
ness and decency of any state should be assessed not alone through a
study of whether its majorities examine it and find it good, but through a
study of whether its minorities examine it and find it good. Another way
to look at the matter is this: the justice of a state is not measured merely
by its authority's tolerance for dissent, but also by its dissenters' toler
ance for authority. [p. 97]

Carter, like Shiffrin, sees dissent as essential to the construction of
a just polity. "Civic life requires dissent because it requires differences
of opinion in order to spark the dialogues from which the community
thrives and grows."110 Yet, "[i]n contemporary America . . . the nation
is all too full of people and groups who insist that the political sover
eign does not hear their voices" (p. 18). If something is not done to
correct this state of affairs, Carter warns that "disaffection may tum to
disallegiance" (p. 18).
A. Community, Power, and the Importance of Dissent

Majorities naturally attempt to inculcate a common set of values as
part of an ongoing effort to maintain community identity. Sometimes
these efforts are benign, and sometimes they are not. Carter provides
a historical sketch of the use of the public schools as a tool in forging a
single, Protestant concept of American citizenship (pp. 19-45). In
many respects, this effort was less about ensuring universal education
and civic participation than about destroying pre-existing ties to Old
World institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church.
One study of textbooks concluded that the aim of the public schools by
the turn of the century was to replace the love of what was viewed as a
foreign God with a love of America as a country - very much the Know
Nothing program, long after the party itself vanished from the scene.
[pp. 44-45; footnote omitted]

Carter believes that a project of using the public schools to inculcate
Protestant values has now evolved into a project of teaching purely
secular values, including open disrespect for religion and religious in
stitutions (pp. 44-49). He warns that the government sows the "seeds
of disallegiance" when "our 'free' society counts among the powers of
109. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776).
110. P. 16; see also Emerson, supra note 14, at 883-84.
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government the power to use education as the lever to eradicate un
wanted religious traditions" (p. 47).
Unlike Shiffrin, Carter's vision of dissent is completely viewpoint
and speaker-neutral. "It is very much in the nature of the tools of
democratic dissent that they may be used by the bad guys as well as
the good guys" (p. 120). Carter recognizes and embraces the idea that
robust protection of dissent undoubtedly will mean that some parents
inculcate immoral and unjust ideas in their children. "The freedom of
the family to make religious choices - a freedom that is essential if
religious communities are to be able to survive by projecting their nar
ratives over time - must include the freedom to make choices other
than the best" (p. 48). Freedom necessarily encompasses "the privi
lege of making mistakes" (p. 48). If the state attempts to replace pa
rental values with the government's values, parents will respond first
with dissent and, if this proves unavailing, with disallegiance.
Professor Carter pursues this idea to its logical conclusion: a right
of revolution in the face of an unresponsive government (pp. 53-99).
In his view, we increasingly run the risk of forcing loyal, but dissenting,
citizens to consider this alternative because of the community's refusal
to take seriously their objections to a number of current social policies
(most notably including legalized abortion). Pointing to the Supreme
Court's contemporary free exercise jurisprudence as a case in point,
Carter suggests that the government's effective message to religious
minorities is "it doesn't matter if the secular sovereign makes it diffi
cult for you to practice your religion, because there are lots of other
religions out there, and you can choose one of the others instead" (p.
57). Returning to his theme of dissent, Carter posits that although
" [i]t is, of course, vital to the notion of witness that the witnesses can
be seen and heard" the secular authorities nevertheless have sanc
tioned the "remov[al] of pro-life protesters from defined zones in
front of clinics where abortions are performed" (p. 60).
Properly understood and implemented, a meaningful commitment
to free speech values, at one time or another, will prove vexing to all
constituencies within the community. "This is perhaps the principal
glory of our First Amendment tradition: properly understood, it frus
trates everybody - or at least everybody possessing the will to censor
debate and the political power with which to do it" (p. 65). The prob
lem, as Carter sees it, is that religiously motivated dissent is no longer
taken seriously by either the government or the secular cultural ma
jority. This then forces religiously motivated dissenters to consider re
sorting to political crimes in order to bring their concerns to the atten
tion of the community and provoke some kind of response (pp. 67-78).
Thus, if a government meets repeated petitions with "repeated
Injuries," the government loses its right to command the allegiance of
the dissenters (pp. 9-13). At the same time, problems arise because
governments and dominant community groups often equate dissent
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with disallegiance or disloyalty (pp. 16-19). The problem is exacer
bated when religious communities attempt to establish themselves as
separate communities within the larger whole (pp. 67-86). Carter ac
knowledges that some self-constituted groups engage in grossly anti
social behaviors, like murdering physicians who perform abortions or
bombing federal buildings. Nevertheless, "[ o]ne must not make the
mistake of assuming that the violence and perhaps paranoia of these
groups is an argument against the ideal of self-constituted communi
ties; it is simply evidence, were any needed, that there is wickedness
everywhere" (p. 83).
B. Reaffirming the National Commitment to Dissent
Significantly, Carter's arguments are aimed far less at fringe groups
than traditional liberals, whose commitment to free speech principles
has been wavering of late.111 "[I]f we are to preach more tolerance, it
is not sufficient to preach it to intolerant, divisive religionists, of which
there are many; we must preach it as well to intolerant, divisive secular
liberals, many of whom seem to value diversity across every spectrum
except the religious" (p. 85). He further posits that the success of the
liberal agenda has created ambivalence about the use of state power to
squelch dissent. "This is a greater problem for liberalism in the 1990s
than it was in the 1960s because liberalism has won so many political
battles in the intervening decades that it has developed a troubling
moral complacency, particularly with respect to the tough questioning
of authority that was once its glory" (pp. 85-86). This "complacency"
has led to free speech backsliding:
It is indeed a bit embarrassing, given the 1960s, but when today's liberals
talk about, say, protests at abortion clinics, one can hear, echoing down
time's corridors, the terrifying logic of the silencing slogan of the silent
majority days: "America - Love it or Leave It!" Which means, of
course, "Our America - do it our way or go to jail!" [p. 86]
How then, should free speech theory attempt to address the phe
nomenon of religiously motivated dissent? Professor Carter argues
for a "dialogue" based model in which dissent is not ignored or deval111. To the extent Professor Carter's intended audience encompasses leftists and radi
cals, his proposals are likely to receive a decidedly frostier reception than Professor
Shriffrin's dissent thesis. This is because Professor Carter's paradigmatic dissenters - re
ligiously motivated opponents of abortion rights - are a group potentially silenced (or at
least muzzled) under Professor Shriffin's dissent theory of free speech. Although one should
not overgeneralize, most leftists and radicals within the legal academy support efforts to re
duce gender subordination and enhance feminist agency, and therefore, would view
women's potential loss of control over reproduction as a serious setback to the cause. In this
way, Professor Carter's model of dissenters illustrates a potential objection to Professor
Shiffrin's theory, at least if one believes (as most liberals do) that the viewpoint of a speaker
generally should not prefigure whether particular speech activity merits or enjoys constitu
tional protection.
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ued merely because the speaker happens to possess religious motiva
tions, or uses overtly religious arguments, for advancing her position.
Such an approach would "mean that there is nothing about the relig
ious source of their convictions that should bar them from public dia
logue - a terrible rule, and one which, as I have mentioned, would
have destroyed or severely disabled the moral arguments of both the
Abolitionist movement and the civil rights movement" (p. 93).
Professor Carter lodges his complaint not so much against Con
gress and the Executive Branch of the federal government, but rather
against the federal judiciary, which, in his view, has been insufficiently
protective of religiously motivated dissenters within the community.
He believes the federal courts are overconfident of their analytical ca
pabilities; the project of judicial review (or judicial supremacy) "rests
on the foundational point that the courts are far wiser than anybody
else (sovereign or citizens) and thus must be obeyed, always and eve
rywhere and by everyone. Period" (p. 110).
In a move reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln's scathing critique of
the then-recent Dred Scott112 decision during the Lincoln-Douglas de
bates,113 Professor Carter questions whether judicial decisions should
be obeyed if they reject or betray the fundamental moral commit
ments of the community. "[I]t is not obvious· that people will obey ju
dicial opinions that are wrongheaded, and even less obvious that they
should" (p. 114). Contemporary liberal reverence for the courts, sug
gests Carter, is a lingering shadow of the civil rights movement.
'
But that history is of use oruy if we suppose it to prove that judges will
usually be wiser than politicians. At times they are - but over the long
run, the human beings who judge are every bit as capable of error and
wickedness as the human beings who legislate or carry the laws into exe
cution. [p. 131]
Professor Carter is undoubtedly correct. The same Supreme Court
that gave us Brown v. Board of Education114 also gave us Dred Scott v.
Sandford115 and Plessy v. Ferguson116 (not to mention Korematsu117 and
Bowers v. Hardwick118). Simply put, there is no reason to believe that
112. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
113. See The First Joint Debate at Ottawa (Aug. 21, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS
DEBATES 40, 74-77 (Harold Holzer ed., 1993); The Third Joint Debate at Jonesboro (Sept.
15, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra, at 136, 168-72; The Fifth Joint De
bate at Gatesburg (Oct. 7, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra, at 234, 26264; The Seventh Joint Debate at Alton (Oct. 15, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS
DEBATES, supra, at 321, 360-62.
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
116. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
117. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
118. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

1652

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1613

the courts alone possess the ability to engage in virtuous or just poli
cymaking, or that they will do so on a consistent basis.119 Of course,
judges, unlike members of Congress or the President, do not face
regular democratic accountability (i.e., the need to seek and obtain re
election to office). Institutionally, at least, they are better positioned
to interpose themselves between the wishes of the majority and the
rights of an unpopular minority.120 Although Professor Carter rightly
questions whether the federal judiciary's decisions routinely promote
justice, in some respects he fails to credit the judiciary for its moral
victories.
For example, Professor Carter makes much of the fact that the
Supreme Court upheld "breach of the peace" convictions against
Martin Luther King, Jr. and other members of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference for marching in Birmingham, Alabama on
Easter Sunday without a permit.121 He does not mention that the piv
otal moment of the civil rights movement - the Selma-to
Montgomery March - took place under the protection of a federal
court order issued by district judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.122 Given the
scope, scale, and duration of this mass protest activity, it is rather diffi
cult to imagine how it could have taken place without the formal sanc
tion of law.
The Selma March ignited the conscience of the national commu
nity and led to the passage of the landmark Voting Rights Act of
1965.123 More than any other mass-protest action, it changed the face
of the nation. Federal judicial intervention sustained the march
against the entrenched opposition of every element of the state gov
ernment.124 Professor Carter's unqualified slashing attacks on the fed
eral judiciary give insufficient credit to the personal and professional
sacrifices of judges like Frank M. Johnson, Jr., J. Skelly Wright, Elbert
P. Tuttle, John R. Brown, John Minor Wisdom, and Richard T.
Rives.125
119. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 49-60 (1998); cf. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNA
TIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-13, 123-50,
232-70 (1994).
120. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLmCS (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
121. Pp. 105-10. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
122. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965); see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis,
104 YALE LJ. 1411 (1995).
123. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973
(1994)); Krotoszynski, supra note 122, at 1412, 1427-28.
124. See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 105-09.
125. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
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Professor Carter's attack on the judiciary is really in the service of
a subsidiary point, however. Given that the judiciary is not infallible,
it is entirely reasonable to suppose that citizens might profoundly dis
agree with a particular decision of the federal courts. In his view, Roe
v. Wade126 presents a good example of this phenomenon. Carter ar
gues that Roe rests not on constitutional principle, but rather on the
"moral instincts" of the Justices composing the Supreme Court's ma
jority in favor of the result (p. 136). Given this state of affairs, he asks:
"Would it be so unreasonable for an aroused citizen - or an aroused
majority of citizens - to wonder why the judges' moral instincts are a
better extra-constitutional source than the moral instincts of the peo
ple themselves?" (p. 136). His answer: "Clearly not; nor can the
judges themselves provide a persuasive response, unless the response
indicates a willingness to engage in that conversation - not mono
logue - of which Bickel wrote. "127
Only by taking seriously the dissent of cultural, racial, or religious
minorities can the nation lay a valid claim to respecting democratic
pluralism. "In all of this, my concern has been for the autonomy of
the many communities - particularly, but not exclusively, religious
communities - into which democratic citizens organize themselves"
(p. 142). Respect for democratic pluralism means respecting opinions
that may seem wrongheaded, or even evil: "That the mores of some
communities may seem to be morally objectionable or simply bizarre
only fortifies the point, for it is only through the willingness to accept
these differences that we become truly democratic" (p. 142). Rather
than using law to disperse and destroy these self-constituted communi
ties, government "should more properly serve as a means to preserve
the diversity among our communities of meaning" (p. 142).

Making the Case for According Religiously Motivated Dissent
Greater Solicitude: Mixed Motives and the Need to Recognize the
Difference Between Jihad and Community Survival

C.

One would be hard-pressed to disagree with Professor Carter's
plea that we take the opinions of religiously motivated dissenters seri
ously. Undoubtedly, such speakers often fail to secure a meaningful
hearing because many object to the idea of imposing public policies on
the general community based on a particular set of religious commit
ments. Indeed, when John Kennedy ran for president in 1960, many
commentators worried about whether Kennedy would make inde-

126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. P. 136. See BICKEL, supra note 120, at 26, 65-72, 117, 127-33, 205-06, 235-43, 261;
M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 110-11 (1975); see also Barry
Friendman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586-90, 653-80 (1993);
Krotoszynski, supra note 119, at 46.
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pendent policy determinations free and clear of Vatican influence.128
More recently, New York governor Mario Cuomo wrestled with the
problem of squaring his official duties with his Catholic faith, particu
larly with regard to the abortion issue.129
At the same time, there is something disturbing about a particular
religious sect's attempting to use the levers of secular power to achieve
sectarian aims. For example, the recent controversy in Kansas over
the teaching of evolution strongly suggests that religious dissenters do
not merely want a hearing, they want to win the debate and implement
their policy views on the entire political community.130 The Kansas
state school board's decision to remove evolution from the state
mandated science curriculum was not an isolated event - across the
nation, religious fundamentalists are working daily to take over local
and state school boards, often with tremendous success.131
128. See LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND .AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 172
{1967); 'THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MA.KING OF TIIE PRESIDENT, 1960, at 259-62 (1961);
John F. Kennedy, Jr., Remarks on Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1960, § 1, at 22,
reprinted in CHlJRCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 190 (John F. Wilson & Donald L.
Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1987); see also Paul J. Weithman, John Courtney Murray - Do His
Ideas Still Matter?, AMERICA, Oct. 29, 1994, at 17; Catholicism and the Campaign, 72
COMMONWEAL 507-08 {1960). In an earlier presidential campaign, the election of 1928,
New York Governor Al Smith, the Democratic nominee, came under sharp attack because
of his membership in the Roman Catholic Church and, like John F. Kennedy, found himself
forced to defend his religious associations. See Arthur Schlesinger Jr., O'Connor, Vaughan,
Cuomo, Al Smith, J.F.K., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at A31.
129. See Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's
Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 13 {1984); see also Ari L. Goldman,
New York's Controversial Archbishop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 38; Sam
Roberts, Cuomo to Challenge Archbishop over Criticism of Abortion Stand, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1984, at Al. Catholic scholars have noted the potential difficulties of remaining
faithful to the teachings of the Church while discharging a civil function. See, e.g., John H.
Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1998);
John H. Garvey, The Pope's Submarine, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849 {1993).
130. See Pam Belluck, Board for Kansas Deletes Evolution from Curriculum, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at Al; Jacques Steinberg, Evolution Struggle Shifts to Kansas School
Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1999, at Al. The Kansas School Board came under sharp
criticism for its decision. Noted Harvard paleontologist, Stephen Jay Gould, described the
decision as "like saying '[w]e're going to continue to teach English, but you don't have to
teach grammar,' " and predicted that the citizens of Kansas "would be profoundly embar·
rassed by the stupidity of the ruling" and "would vote that school board out of office the
next year." Claudia Dreifus, Primordial Beasts, Creationists, and Mighty Yankees, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999, at F3.
131. Hanna Rosin, Creationism Evolves, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1999, at Al ("In the last
four years, school boards in at least seven states - Arizona, Alabama, Illinois, New Mexico,
Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska - have tried to remove evolution from state science standards
or water down the concepts, with varying degrees of success."); see also Sandra Blakeslee, In
Schools Across the Land, a Group Mounts Counterattacks on "Creation Science," N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, § 1, at 20; Hanna Rosin, Creationism, Coming to Life in Suburbia,
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1999, at Al. Dr. Stephen Jay Gould blames this state of affairs on apa
thy toward school board elections:
The only reason it [the Kansas decision to remove evolution from the state's science cur
riculum] happened is that nobody votes in school board elections anymore. Thus, deter
mined minorities can take over. It took this fundamentalist group three election cycles to
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There is something inherently destructive of political community
when one group of citizens attempts to impose theologically grounded
public policies on citizens who do not share the same set of theological
commitments.132 It is one thing to say that feeding the hungry makes
for good public policy; it is another to say that, because Jesus com
mands the feeding of the hungry, those who oppose the policy will
surely burn in hell.133 "Competition among religions for position
within government must be avoided so that none need fear any other,
as each might otherwise seek its own establishment through govern
ment or within govemment."134
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger elaborated on these concerns in his
landmark opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman.135
He argued that
"[o]rdinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even

take over in Kansas. They only have a one-vote majority, 6-4. Four are up for election next
year.
Dreifus, supra note

130.

132. See Cuomo, supra note 129, at 16-20. As Governor Cuomo puts the matter:
I protect my right to be a Catholic by preserving your right to believe as a Jew, a Protestant
or non-believer, or as anything else you choose. We know that the price of seeking to force
our beliefs on others is that they might some day force theirs on us. This freedom is the fun
damental strength of our unique experiment in government. In the complex interplay of
forces and considerations that go into the making of our laws and policies, its preservation
must be a pervasive and dominant concern.
at 16; see also James Madison, The Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As
sessments, June 20, 1785, reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 301-02
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (warning against the infusion of sectarian argumenta
tion in public policy debates "[b]ecause it will have a • . . tendency to banish our Citizens"
(i.e., utterly alienate them from the project of democratic discourse on the basis of relig
ion.)). But cf. Ronald Reagan, Politics and Morality Are Inseparable, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7 (1984) (arguing in favor of active efforts by people of faith to seek
legislative reforms incorporating their faith-based policy preferences).

Id.

133. See Cuomo, supra note 129, at 19-20. As Justice Jackson stated the matter:
,
This freedom [freedom from "establishments" of religion] was first in the Bill of Rights be
cause it was first in the forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength
is its rigidity. It was intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep
religion's hands off the state, and above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public
life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control of public policy or
the public purse.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson
plainly believed that overt efforts to inject questions of faith into public policy debates might
bring about highly divisive church/state relationships that would undermine confidence in
the civil state and risk the autonomy of communities of faith. Of course, Professor Carter is
not arguing for the creation of John Calvin's Geneva, but he is arguing that those who advo
cate such arrangements receive a full and fair hearing from the general community. At least
arguably, encouraging overt efforts to give greater weight to those who generally reject a
strict separation of church doctrine and matters of state risks the advent of irreconcilable
divisions within the community. One need look no further than modern day Northern Ire
land to see the potential negative effects of overtly evangelized politics.

134. William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 777-78.
135. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic sys
tem of government, but political division along religious lines was one
of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended
to protect."136 In Burger's view, "[t]he potential divisiveness of such
conflict is a threat to the normal political process."137 This does not
mean, of course, that religiously motivated dissent should not enjoy
First Amendment protection. Rather, it suggests that, in a pluralistic
community, constituted by individuals possessing myriad racial, cul
tural, and religious identities, overt efforts to impose public policies
based on faith-based understandings of appropriate human behavior
might not represent the best course of action for the community. In
public policy terms, efforts to inject facially theological arguments into
policy debates (i.e., "God commands that abortion be treated as mur
der") run a serious risk of ending, rather than facilitating, the conver
sation. Moreover, it is far from clear that a law passed solely in order
to satisfy religious scruples (or primarily for that purpose) would pass
muster under Establishment Clause analysis.138
Professor Carter makes strong arguments for the benefits of relig
iously motivated dissent, and posits some rather nasty consequences of
completely ignoring such speakers, but he never really attempts to
present or consider the other side of the question. Is self-consciously
religiously motivated public policy sustainable in a pluralistic democ
racy? This is a question that Carter never asks, much less answers.
Consider, for example, anti-abortion protestors. Professor Carter
consistently uses anti-abortion protestors as his paradigm of ignored,
slighted, and legally marginalized religiously motivated dissenters. He
argues strongly that the general community must engage such dissent
ers on the merits of their position in an ongoing "dialogue" about
community values (pp. 20, 60-61, 74-81, 90-95, 134-36). The problem,
of course, is that the most committed anti-abortion protestors view
abortion as murder - no different than randomly shooting a passerby
on the street. Carter seems to be aware of this faction of the pro-life
movement:
After all, if a pro-life protester is persuaded by his religious understand
ing that fetuses are human, that abortion is murder, and that physicians
136. Id. at 622; see also Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1680, 1692 (1969) ("While political debate and division is normally a wholesome proc·
ess for reaching viable acco=odations, political division on religious lines is one of the
principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall.").
137. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
138. See id. at 612-13 (holding that a "statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or printary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits relig·
ion, finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with relig
ion' " (citations omitted)). A Jaw passed in order to satisfy the religious convictions of a par
ticular religious sect arguably lacks a secular purpose and, moreover, directly advances a
particular religion's social objectives.
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who perform abortions are thus, literally, baby-killers, why (other than
moral cowardice, a fear to face the judgment of the society) should he
not kill the doctors? [p. 74]
The question that begs to be asked is: How can one sustain a mean
ingful dialogue with such a person? Although Carter faults secular
liberals for dismissing, out-of-hand, the viewpoints of religious dis
senters, he fails to acknowledge the unwillingness of many religious
dissenters to compromise. Compromise, of course, is the mortar of
democratic self-government.
Thus, a careful reader might lodge a rather basic objection to Pro
fessor Carter's theory of free speech: he seeks a dialogue with persons
unwilling to compromise what they believe to be divinely ordered
resolutions to hotly contested questions of public policy. A person
who believes that God has commanded a particular result is unlikely
to strike a deal that involves anything short of total victory.
As the existential philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, explained so
eloquently, faith ceases to be faith when one has reasons for holding a
particular belief.139 In Kierkegaard's view, real faith requires the cruci
fixion of reason and the embrace of the "absurd" - strongly held, en
tirely intuitive convictions that one simply cannot justify through ra
tional explication.140 Thus, the very idea of rational dialogue about
matters of faith confronts a difficulty: faith does not subsist on reason,

139. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the "Philosophi
cal Fragments": An Existential Contribution by Johannes Climacus, reprinted in A
KIERKEGAARD ANTHOLOGY 190, 214-216 {Robert Bretall ed., 1946) {1843) [hereinafter
Kierkegaard, Postscript]; SOREN KIERKEGAARD, Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric,
reprinted in A KIERKEGAARD ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 116, 130-34 [hereinafter Kierkegaard,
Fear and Trembling]. As Kierkegaard puts the matter:

Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite pas
sion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am capable of grasping
God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must believe. If I
wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast to objective un
certainty, so that in the objective uncertainty I am out "upon the seven fathoms of water"
and yet believe.
KIERKEGAARD, Postscript, supra, at 215.
140. See KIERKEGAARD, Postscript, supra note 139, at 255 {"Faith is the objective un
certainty along with the repulsion of the absurd held fast in the passion of inwardness, which
precisely is inwardness potentiated to the highest degree."). In this regard, it bears noting
that Abraham serves as Kierkegaard's archetype of faith because Abraham was prepared to
violate all universalist ethical prescriptions by murdering his son, Isaac. See KIERKEGAARD,
Fear and Trembling, supra note 139, at 130-34. Abraham possessed such faith that he was
willing to murder his own son because he believed that God required him to do so. See id.
Of course, one longs to ask the question: "What if Abraham was wrong about God's will?"
As Kierkegaard aptly notes, "[t]herefore, although Abraham arouses my admiration, he at
the same time appalls me." Id. at 133. Abraham's story represents an individual transcend
ing traditional notions of morality because faith requires him to do so. "The story of
Abraham contains therefore a teleological suspension of the ethical." Id. at 134. Abraham
transcends the universal - "[i]f such is not the position of Abraham, then he is not even a
tragic hero but a murderer." Id. Accordingly, "[f]aith is a miracle, and yet man is not ex
cluded from it; for that in which all human life is unified is passion, and faith is a passion."
Id.
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but belief. There is little cause to suppose that a dialogue challenging
someone's most fundamental teleological commitments will prove
fruitful: "to him who follows the narrow way of faith, no one can give
counsel, him no one can understand."141
In light of the bitter disagreements associated with knowing
"God's will,'' the history of theocratic states has not been particularly
happy, and the admixture of religion and politics has led to a great
deal of bloodshed throughout human history.142 As Professor William
Van Alstyne has explained, "The idea of a civil nation of free people,
diverse in their thoughts, equal in their citizenship, and with none to
feel alien, outcast, or stranger in relation to civil authority, remains
powerful and compelling."143 The problem boils down to this: How
does one maintain a meaningful dialogue with a person who, by divine
ordinance, cannot compromise her demands of the secular state? Pro
fessor Carter does not offer much help on this aspect of the problem.
Moreover, given that the secular state permits citizens to organize
into separate "communities within the community,'' the state's toler
ance for a particular behavior does not effectively mean that all citi
zens must engage in the behavior. If a particular religious community
rejects homosexual sodomy as an abomination in the sight of God, it is
quite free to maintain that belief and its members are free to conduct
their sexual lives in accordance with it. The group's members may
teach this value to their children and remove them from the public
schools in order to ensure that secular authorities do not inculcate
contrary values.144 Beyond this, however, I am not sure what claim of
right the self-constituted religious community should have over the
rest of the community.
That is to say, if a majority of citizens embrace sexual autonomy as
an official state policy, I do not think that a religious dissenter has a
right to demand the reenactment of the proscription against sodomy.
I do not disagree with Carter that a person seeking such a legislative
change ought to be permitted to speak in favor of a return to tradi
tional morals,145 but a failure on the part of the community to act on
that suggestion, or even to afford the religiously motivated dissenter a
polite audience, would not justify acts of terrorism against the state by
the religious dissenter.
141. KIERKEGAARD, Fear and Trembling, supra note 139, at 134.
142. The Thirty Years' War is one example; the present dysfunctions in Northern
Ireland provide yet another. When religionists attempt to use the secular state as a tool of
indoctrination {whether voluntary or not), those who are not co-religionists are likely to re
spond negatively (not to put too fine a point on the matter).
143. Van Alstyne, supra note 134, at 787.
144. The Constitution certainly would privilege such a decision. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
145. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 308-10 (1940).

May 2000]

Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search

1659

Thus, if the community affords greater opportunities for religious
dissent, but nevertheless rejects the positions advanced by the relig
ious dissenters, I am not at all convinced that the religious dissenters
will let the matter go. To put the matter in Carter's nomenclature, af
ter the "repeated petitions" of the anti-sodomy religious dissenters fail
to achieve meaningful social and legal reforms, are they then free to
proclaim their "disallegiance" from the community and take up armed
resistance?146 Portions of Professor Carter's book suggest that this re
sult is not untenable (pp. 19-27, 73-89).
At bottom, Professor Carter offers up a consequentialist vision of
free speech: take seriously dissent from disaffected members of the
community, be prepared to defend the existing social ordering on the
merits, or face the growing possibility of dissenters renouncing their
loyalty to the government and seeking change through an inherent
right of revolution. At the same time, he emphasizes that "I am not
insisting that the ability of a community to define itself must be with
out limits" (p. 89). Nevertheless, Carter concludes that:

in a society founded on ·a Declaration of Independence that warns
against the rejection of repeated petitions of the citizenry, those limits
should be few, and we must avoid the totalizing tendency to treat all of
our deeply held values as principles by which not only the national sov
ereign but every community, no matter how constituted, must be bound.
[p. 89]
The problem, of course, is that religious dissenters not only want to be
self-regulating (to a large extent they already are), but rather that they
wish to impose a theocratically inspired set of health, safety, and mor
als regulations on everybody else!
Again, I do not disagree with Prof�ssor Carter's suggestion that
religious dissenters bent on imposing "totalizing" theocratic visions on
the body politic should have their say; the First Amendment should, at
a minimum, debar government from picking and choosing free speech
winners and free speech losers.147 Religiously motivated speakers
146. Actually, Mr. Eric Robert Rudolph appe�rs to have jumped the gun. In the last
three years, he allegedly has bombed the Atlanta Olympic festivities, a lesbian bar, and sev
eral abortion clinics. See Thomas B. Edsall, Clinic Bombing Probed For Link to Rudolph,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1999, at A20; Sue Anne Pressley, Carolinians Doubt Rudolph Is
Hiding In Their Mountains, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1999, at A3. No serious person could ar
gue that Mr. Rudolph's actions are justified because the general community decided to hold
an international athletic competition that celebrates international cooperation, tolerates bars
catering to a predominantly lesbian clientele, and permits abortion se):Vices. But see Carolyn
Tuft & Joe Holleman, Inside the Christian Identity Movement, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Mar. 5, 2000, at AS (describing the rise of the Christian Identity movement and the penchant
of some adherents to use violence when less drastic approaches fail to achieve social
change).
147. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); see also Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951). But cf. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Womens' Health Ctrs, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994);
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
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should (and do) enjoy the same free speech rights as those engaged in
nonreligiously motivated speech activities.148 That said, I worry about
the implications of Professor Carter's theory when the religious dis
senters fail to convince the general public to embrace their vision for a
virtuous community. Perhaps he seriously believes that a polite audi
ence will satisfy religious dissenters, even if they inevitably fail to se
cure meaningful reforms. One would have reason to believe, however,
that Jehovah might demand something more than democratic dis
course, if democratic discourse fails to get the job done.
With respect to homosexuality, Professor Carter suggests that
meeting religious objections would be a relatively simple task:
So, even though, for reasons I have already noted, it is foolish and his
torically naive to meet religious objections to homosexuality by asserting
that religionists cannot impose their moral judgments on anybody else, it
strikes me as fairly easy to meet the objections on the merits, that is, to
defend the privacy right that covers sexual conduct. [p. 91]
It might be easy to make logical arguments about the benefits of
living in a society that respects sexual autonomy as an integral aspect
of personal autonomy, or personal privacy. It is quite another thing to
believe that such arguments would prove persuasive to someone who
takes Leviticus literally, and believes Leviticus to be the divine word
of God made known to man. Indeed, if the argument were so self
evident and easy to make convincingly, one might ask Professor
Carter to explain the seeming anomaly of Bowers v. Hardwick,149 a
case in which the Chief Justice of the United States invokes the
"Judeao-Christian" proscription against homosexual sodomy as a suf
ficient reason for sustaining a Georgia law prohibiting it.150
The fact of the matter is that reasoned discourse stands little
chance against the divine word of God. Thus, it seems hopelessly na
Yve to suggest that
[o]ne triumphs, in other words, by doing that which I have stressed else
where is the only democratic way to meet religious claims of morality in
the public square: to argue against them on the merits, by presenting the
case for defeating them in terms independent of the religious source of
the values in question. [p. 91]
But why is there any reason to believe that reasoned discourse will be
at all convincing to a person who sincerely believes she is attempting
to do God's will? Indeed, a person who devoutly believes that, by ob148. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-95
(1993) (prohibiting viewpoint discrimination against religiously motivated speakers wishing
to use school facilities after-hours for a film series); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi
tors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951).
149. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
150. See id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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taining (or, as is often the case preserving) a proscription against a
particular sexual activity, she will be "saving" potential sinners from
their own base appetites is unlikely to be moved by policy arguments,
no matter how artfully constructed. It is more than ironic that Profes
sor Carter would call for respect and tolerance of people who, in many
instances, do not accord similar respect and tolerance to sexual mi
norities. How does the Christian so-called "formerly gay" movement
fit into Professor Carter's moral universe? Why should a gay man or
lesbian take seriously someone who views their most basic life choices
as an abomination, something to be "fixed," whether voluntarily or
not?
Perhaps anticipating these criticisms, Professor Carter notes that
"[a]s a scholar and citizen who is a Christian, I worry about the obses
sion of some members of my faith with rules to govern sexuality" (p.
91). With all due respect, tell that to the parents of Matthew Shepard.
Moreover, please explain to them why the anti-gay protestors at
Matthew's funeral merit careful and solicitous consideration, as these
zealots chant that their son burns in hell because "God hates fags ."151
The remarkable cruelty of some "religious dissenters" toward sexual
minorities has become so extreme152 that even religious leaders long

151. Associated Press, Protest Greets Meeting on Antigay Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1999, at A30. Among the anti-gay protests were signs reading "Matt is in hell and God hates
fags," Scott Simon & Mark Roberts, Matthew Shepard Funeral, NPR Weekend Saturday,
Transcript No. 98101703-214 (Oct. 17,- 1998), "No Fags in Heaven" and "No Tears for
Queers," Tom Kenworthy, A Gentle Spirit Mourned, THE RECORD, Oct. 17, 1999, at Al. In
a circus-like atmosphere, anti-gay protesters screamed that "fags, if you don't repent, he will
bum in hell right now," "it's the word of God," Simon & Roberts, supra, "God don't live by
Sodom and Gomorra," "He lived in shame, he died in shame," Dennis Shepard et al., ABC
Nightline, Transcript # 98101601-j07 (Oct. 16, 1998), and "Matthew was wicked!," Registers
Wire Service, Nation Grieves for Shepard, DES MOINES REGISTER, Oct. 17, 1999, at 1. Just
in case, the protesters also "blanketed the local media with profane leaflets to make sure
that they were noticed." Shepard et al., supra. Surely National Public Radio commentator,
Scott Simon, got it exactly right when, in opening a report on Matthew Shepard's funeral, he
began by noting that "[t]he greatest tragedy that life can call upon a parent to experience is
to bury a child." Simon & Roberts, supra. To expose Mr. and Mrs. Shepard to homophobic
taunts and jeers at the funeral of their murdered son represents an almost unimaginable ca
pacity for cruelty.
152. Religiously motivated bigots regularly picket political meetings of gay and lesbian
organizations, see Peter Baker, Clinton Equates Gay Rights, Civil Rights, WASH. POST, Nov.
9, 1997, at A18 (reporting that during a Human Rights Campaign fundraiser featuring Presi
dent Clinton, a "small cluster of people holding signs saying 'God Hates Fags' " stood out
side the hotel); at religious celebrations of gays and lesbians, see Rene Sanchez, At Gay
Wedding, Methodists Take A Vow Against Church Ban, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at A3
(reporting that outside a convention center where two lesbians were being married by a
Methodist minister, "the mood was tense. Under the close watch of police officers on
horseback, about a dozen protesters who were kept across the street railed against homo
sexuality, waving signs such as 'God Hates Fags' "); and even, sadly, at the funerals of gay
men who die of AIDS or at the hands of bigots, see Associated Press, Protest Greets Meeting
on Antigay Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at A30 (noting that Rev. Fred Phelps and
other Christian protesters "taunted gays at the funeral of Matthew Shepard"); Annie
Gowen, Holy Hell, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1995, at Fl ("Phelps pickets funerals of AIDS vic
tims."). Given the utter incivility of these religiously motivated speakers, it is difficult to un-
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associated with anti-gay speech activities have taken great pains, of
late, to show that they hate the sin but love the sinner.153
The infamous Reverend Fred Phelps, of Topeka, Kansas, provides
a useful illustration. Rev. Phelps regularly pickets churches in Topeka
(and elsewhere) that he deems insufficiently committed to eradicating
homosexuality, welcoming worshippers with greetings such as
"Sodom! That's a sodomite church!," and "It's a leper colony. Un
clean! Unclean! "154 Phelps and his supporters told a local Episcopal
minister that he "drink[s] anal blood at the altar of the sphincter" and
chanted "Rectum Bob, smells like his name."155 Then, there are the
good old standbys on signs, placards, and t-shirts: "Thank God for
AIDS," "Fags Bum in Hell," and "God Hates Fags."156 Phelps is an
apostle of hate, who nevertheless 'claims · that his mission has divine
sanction because "God hates them [homosexuals] too."157 Professor
Carter cites Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. as a paradigm of the
religiously motivated dissenter. The problem, of course, is that not all
religious dissenters will pursue a more just ordering of the community
- witness Rev. Phelps.
At an even more extreme position from Rev. Phelps, consider
Benjamin Matthew Williams, another deeply committed person of
faith who, in July 1999, shot and killed a gay couple in Sacramento,
California. In an interview with a reporter from a local newspaper,
Williams explained that "I'm not guilty of murder." Why? "I'm guilty
of obeying the laws of the Creator . . . . So many people claim to be
Christians and complain about all these things their religion says are a
sin, but they're not willing to do anything about it."158 Obviously, it
would be grossly unfair to characterize all religious dissenters as hav
ing a common cause with persons like Rev. Phelps or Mr. Williams.
Nevertheless, people like Phelps and Williams are engaged in religderstand why Professor Carter believes that the general community owes them anything
more than a polite hearing on the merits of their positions.
153. See Frank Rich, Has Jerry Falwell Seen the Light?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at
A17. As Rev. Falwell recently put the matter, "Many of us pastors like to talk about loving
the sinner but hating the sin . . . [but] unfortunately, that statement has often become a
meaningless cliche . . . [because] we too often fall short of the mark of . . . truly loving the
sinner." Id. (last omission in original). Rev. Falwell explained that "[a]dmittedly, evangeli
cals have not exhibited an ability to build a bond of friendship to the gay and lesbian com
munity. We've said to go somewhere else, we don't need you here [at] our churches." Id.
(alteration in original).
154. Gowen, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Rich, supra note 153; see also Bailey, supra note 69 ("Benjamin Williams said the
slaying of the gay couple was justified as an execution because they had violated biblical law.
He said his defense in the murder case will be based on his belief that the Bible condemns
homosexuality as a crime punishable by death.").
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iously motivated dissent.159 To the extent that Professor Carter could
be understood to seek a careful hearing of the views expressed by such
folk and their ilk, he asks far too much of the community in general
and sexual minorities in particular.160 The First Amendment might re
quire that people who cheerfully assert that "Fag is a good Bible word,
don't forget,"161 be free of direct government censorship.162 It does not
require that the community take them or their views seriously.
Professor Carter makes frequent reference to anti-abortion protes
tors as models of those engaged in religiously motivated dissent (pp.
19-21, 60-61, 80-81, 89-95, 134-36). As with anti-gay protestors, the
tactics of some in the pro-life movement breach even the most mini
malist expectations of civility. Although "[p]eaceful picketing has rou
tinely occurred outside clinics, with demonstrators carrying signs or
placards expressing their viewpoint that abortion is murder," anti
abortion protest activities have gone well beyond relatively passive
picketing efforts "to [include the] disruptive use of bullhorns, the
forming of a 'gauntlet' through which patients must pass, the photo
graphing of patients, and the taunting of clinic personnel."163 Some
pro-life activists engage in "sidewalk counseling," which can involve
anything from attempts to engage a patient in a conversation about
her abortion decision to threats and physical intimidation. "Over the
years and recently with greater frequency, clinic protest has escalated

159. The Supreme Court has made clear that expressive conduct constitutes speech,
even if it is not constitutionally protected under all circumstances. See Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 402-06 (1989); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-78 (1968).
160. In this regard, it is difficult to find much moral fault with the "angry mob" that
pelted Phelps and his disciples "with eggs and excrement" as they attempted to protest at the
funeral of gay writer Randy Shilts, who died of AIDS. See Gowen, supra note 152. As a
legal matter, Reverend Phelps is, of course, entitled to- the fullest protection that the First
Amendment has to offer. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); see also
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875, 878-80 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). As Justice Frankfurter succinctly put the matter, "The
State cannot of course forbid public proselytizing or religious argument merely because
public officials disapprove the speaker's views." Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 282 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
161. Gowen, supra note 152 (quoting Rev. Phelps).
162. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-11 (1940); see also Niemotoko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); id. at 273, 282-89 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). As
Justice Blackmun explained in Pico, "our precedents command the conclusion that the state
may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea
for partisan or political reasons." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
163. Laurence J. Eisenstein & Steven Semeraro, Abortion Clinic Protest and the First
Amendment, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 221, 222-23 (1993); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 171 (1990) (reporting that the pro-life movement's
tactics "have included picketing clinics and the homes of clinic staffs, shouting at women
who seek abortions, pelting pregnant teenagers with plastic replicas of fetuses, harassing
clinic employees, chaining themselves to doors, and lying motionless in streets and drive
ways").
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in scale and intensity."164 "For many women and teenage girls, Opera
tion Rescue's blockades have turned the experience of seeking an
abortion into a nightmare of jeering demonstrators, a spectacle that in
tum attracts the added horror of media coverage of this intensely per
sonal decision."165 Moreover, speech activity has given way to violent
expressive conduct: "More violent methods of protest, such as fire
bombing and arson, are not uncommon occurrences at clinics that
provide abortion and family planning and referral services."166
In light of the increased passion of pro-life protestors, state and
federal courts have proved willing to limit pro-life protestors' speech
activities, issuing injunctions that limit not only attempts to impede
physical access to clinics, but also prohibiting sidewalk counseling and
requiring "that protestors act in a non-threatening manner (e.g., no
more than two protestors may approach a patient), remain reasonably
quiet, and cease their counseling if the patient expresses a desire not
to hear it."167 To be sure, behavior sufficient to constitute an assault,
even if engaged in for the purpose of registering opposition to legal
ized abortion, should not enjoy constitutional protection. That said, it
is difficult to square basic free speech theory with restrictions that re
quire protestors to cease speaking when asked to stop or that require
protestors to remain "reasonably quiet." It is unthinkable that such
restrictions would be sustained against protestors objecting to racial
discrimination.168 Although courts have responded to the fact of on
going clinic violence with increasingly broad injunctive relief, fringe
pro-life groups have pledged to continue using force to stop the provi
sion of abortion services, up to and including murdering physicians
providing abortions and their staff members.169
164.

Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 225.

165.

TRIBE, supra note

163,

at

172.

166. Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 225; see also FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO
CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT OF 1994, s. REP. No. 636, at 6-10 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 703-7fJ7 (describing the growing problem of violence at abortion clinics).
167.

Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 231.

168. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
169. See Arianne K. Tepper, Comment, In Your F.A.C.E.: Federal Enforcement of the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, 17 PACE L. REV. 489, 492-95, 535-40
(1997). Roy McMillan, a member of the Mississippi Abortion Abolition Society, frames the
issue in very plain language:
It is justifiable to shoot abortionists. It would be immoral not to do so when all else has
failed. The title's been turning for the past year and a half. People are realizing that vio
lence, violent tactics and shootings are becoming more effective. I have no problem pre
dicting that more doctors will be killed. It's the biblical mandate to protect the innocent un
born.
Marc Cooper, The Changing Landscape of Abortion, GLAMOUR, Aug. 1995, at 251 (inset
box). A Mobile, Alabama Roman Catholic priest, Rev. David Trosch, has gone so far as to
predict that politicians who support abortion rights will be assassinated: "Perhaps, even
probably, the lives of those politicians who fail to strongly oppose abortion will be at risk."
Tepper, supra, at 494.
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The Reverend David C. Trosch, a defrocked Roman Catholic
priest from Mobile, Alabama, teaches that the murder of abortion
providers is morally justified: "[W]e will see the beginning of massive
killing of abortionists and their staffs" because killing those involved
in providing abortions constitutes "justifiable homicide."170 In his
view, " [d]efending innocent human life is not murder,"171 and
"Catholic theology is very clear that the innocent are to be protected.
And the death of an assailant, if warranted, is commendable."172 An
other zealot, Don Treshman, argues that "[w]e're in a war" and "[t]he
only thing is that until recently the casualties have only been on one
side. There are 30 million dead babies and only five people on the
other side, so it's really nothing to get all excited about."173
Allowing that anti-abortion protestors have fared worse than anti
gay protestors in Congress and in the courts,174 the same question
raised in the context of anti-gay protests applies with full force in this
context: how does one engage in a dialogue with someone who sin
cerely believes that God commands an immediate end to abortion
services on demand (and by any means necessary)? The more ex
treme members of the pro-life movement openly promise to use vio
lence if they fail to achieve political results within a time certain and
no amount of dialogue is likely to alter their point of view.
Of course, it might be desirable for members of the community to
attempt to engage these angry citizens - just as such an intervention
might be useful with Rev. Phelps or Mr. Williams. Undoubtedly, some
members of the pro-life movement might be open to compromise or,
having been given a respectful audience, might agree to abjure vio
lence in support of the pro-life cause. To this extent then, attempts at
dialogue could produce some positive results on a case-by-case basis.
It seems hopelessly optimistic to think, however, that Rev. Trosch
(and others like him) will agree to accept any outcome other than total
victory.175 Moreover, clinic patients, staff, and physicians - the usual

170. Laurie Goodstein, Suspended Priest Preaches "New Theology" of Antiabortion
Homicide, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1994, at A3; see also Gustav Niebuhr, To Church's Dismay,
Priest Talks of "Justifiable Homicide" of Abortion Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at
A12.
171. Niebuhr, supra note 170, at Al2.
172. Colman McCarthy, Kennedy, the Church and Dissent, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1994,
at Bll.
173. Catherine S. Manegold, Anti-Abortion Killing: The Movement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1995, at A26.
174. That is to say, no federal statute authorizes injunctive relief against anti·gay pro
tests, nor have courts issued injunctions to limit the antics of Rev. Phelps and his merry
band.
175. See, e.g., John Kifner, Finding a Common Foe, Fringe Groups Join Forces, N.Y.
Dec. 6, 1998, § 4, at 3 (describing the activities and attitudes of violent anti-abortion
protestors, including Neal Horsley, "who maintains an anti-abortion Web site with a logo of
dripping blood and a list of doctors who perform abortions - their names are crossed out if
TIMES,
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audience for such speech activities - have no moral or civic obligation
to attempt such an effort and their failure to attempt a dialogue should
not be construed as an excuse for violence.176
Neither the criminal activities nor the gross and anti-social behav
ior of some anti-abortion protestors should lead courts or legislatures
to conclude that all anti-abortion speech activities - even disruptive
protests at the clinics themselves - should be unprotected. Simply
put, anti-abortion protestors should not be subjected to viewpoint
based legislative and judicial limits on their speech activities. That
said, one would understand completely if a clinic patient or staff
member faced with a fetus-wielding protestor were to abjure any ef
forts at dialogue and engagement.
In short, Professor Carter is undoubtedly correct to assert that re
ligious dissenters should enjoy the same free speech privileges as those
who base their dissent on secular grounds. He also is correct to note
that religiously motivated speakers have led important social reform
movements, including both the abolition and civil rights movements.
At the same time, one should not forget that religiously motivated
speakers also led witch hunts, the Inquisition, and the Crusades. So,
just as federal judges do not possess perfect moral vision, one should
not suppose that religiously motivated dissenters always support jus
tice (or, to use the language of belief, properly understand God's will).
To the extent that one does not share a religious dissenter's theo
logical commitments, and to the extent that the religious dissenter's
they are killed"). Mr. Horsley seems to bear out Professor Carter's dire predictions; he justi
fies the murder of clinic personnel as follows:
The Federal government made up its mind to block any nonviolent attempt to stop abor
tion . . . . The Federal Government literally drove men mad, moved them to execute abor
tionists. When a Federal monolithic government begins to crush the rights of a minority, if
the issues truly matter, fighting men rise up and do the things that fighting men do. In the
life and death struggle to stop this unjustified slaughter, Christian men are looking down the
barrel of a rifle.
Of course, given Mr. Horsley's description of his intended object - "stopping abortion"
- anything short of a total ban or prohibition on abortions would not be acceptable.

Id.

176. One should note that Professor Carter never embraces or endorses violence as a
consequence of failing to take religiously motivated dissenters seriously - he simply pre
dicts that a failure to maintain a meaningful dialogue increases the probability of a resort to
violence, without reaching any definitive conclusions about the moral or legal status of such
a response. Pp. 9-13, 73-78, 80-86. In my view, dissatisfaction with the results of the political
process in the contemporary United States should almost never serve as an excuse to engage
in acts of political terrorism. See Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Civil Disobedience and the
Law, 44 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1969) (arguing that "strong moral conviction is not all that is
required to turn breaking the law into a service that benefits society," noting that "civil dis
obedience necessarily involves violation of the law, and the law can make no provision for its
violation except to hold the offender liable for punishment," rejecting, in unqualified lan
guage, the use of violence in aid of any political, social, religious, or economic objective, and
concluding that, in the contemporary United States, one should embrace "an almost irrebu
table presumption that civil disobedience is not justified"). Although Professor Carter does
not embrace violence as a response to marginalizing religious dissent, he does not squarely
denounce it. Pp. 75, 77-78.

May2000]

Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search

1667

position rests on these commitments, I disagree with Professor Carter
that merely pointing out that fact fails to constitute an adequate re
sponse by the community. If a religious dissenter asserts that "God
hates fags" and therefore sodomy laws should be strictly enforced, it is
more than an adequate response to assert that "my God does not hold
such an attitude toward sexual minorities." Religious dissenters do
not have a right to force the general community to defend autonomy
enhancing legal norms by merely asserting that "God commands
thus." To the extent that Professor Carter suggests otherwise, he
makes an unreasonable demand on the general community.177
Dissent implies an opportunity to make your case, nothing more
and nothing less. Religious dissenters should enjoy the same rights of
access as those who offer secular reasons for their dissent. The
Supreme Court's recent cases involving protests at anti-abortion clin
ics represent an important and unfortunate derogation from this gen
eral principle.178 But a right to make your case does not imply a right
to win, should your case prove unpersuasive to the community.
Moreover, just as the state cannot prescribe the manner in which one
presents her case, the state should not attempt to prescribe the man
ner in which citizens decide to respond to the arguments of religiously
motivated dissenters.179
Finally, one might question the overall accuracy of Professor
Carter's assertion that government ignores the concerns and sensibili
ties of traditionally religious citizens. During the current election sea
son, both Vice-President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W.
Bush have been at great pains to share their personal relationships
with Jesus with the general electorate.180 When asked to name his "fa177. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV.
352, 401 (1985) ("[T]o demand that other people act in accord with dominant religious be
liefs is to promote or impose those beliefs in an impermissible way.").
178. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). Indeed, Justice Scalia has established a pattern of voting
against granting certiorari in abortion protest decisions because "experience suggests that
seeking to bring the First Amendment to the assistance of abortion protesters is more likely
to harm the former than help the latter." Lawson v. Murray, 119 S. Ct. 387, 388 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring in denial of a writ of certiorari); see also Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S.
1110, 1116 {1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in a denial of a writ of certiorari) ("Last Term's de
cision in Madsen . . . has damaged the First Amendment more quickly and more severely
than I feared," but opposing review because "clarification of Madsen is . . . unlikely to occur
in another case involving the currently disfavored class of antiabortion protesters."). But see
Williams v. Planned Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 {1997) {Scalia, J., dis
senting from denial of a writ of certiorari).
179. In this regard, a careful reader should note that Professor Carter's arguments are
not constitutional in nature, but rather represent policy-based recommendations about how
private citizens should respond to the phenomenon of religiously based dissent.
180. See Maureen Dowd, Playing the Jesus Card, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1999, at A23.
"About 74 percent of those polled described themselves as religious people." John Herbers,
Religion Enters A Political Revival, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1984, § 4, at 1. With numbers like
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vorite political philosopher," Governor Bush responded "Christ, be
cause he changed my heart."181 Gore, anxious to establish his religious
credentials, has proclaimed himself to be a "born-again Christian" on
"60 Minutes" and told columnist Sally Quinn that he regularly asks
himself "W.W.J.D."182 This evidence strongly suggests that religiously
motivated speakers should have little to fear from Washington. As
syndicated columnist Maureen Dowd astutely observed, "When the
Kansas board of education removed evolution from the science cur
riculum testing to make way for creationism, neither Mr. Gore nor Mr.
Bush could bring himself to utter a word in defense of scientific
truth."183
In a recent book examining the increasing political muscle of re
ligious conservatives, Wendy Kaminer argues that complaints about
marginalization to the contrary, religiously conscious citizens wield
more and more secular power.184 After all, Congress and state legisla
tures are busily trying to post the Ten Commandments in schools and
courthouses, not remove them.185 In a similar vein, Professor William
Van Alstyne has suggested that the problem is not the marginalization
of religiously motivated citizens, but rather a creeping risk of
theocracy:

constitutional neologism has nearly displaced the much different fig
ure of speech, that of a "wall of separation" between church and state,
which Thomas Jefferson once used in commemorating the ratification of
the first amendment. The neologism is that insofar as most persons are
religious, it is altogether natural that government should itself reflect that
fact in its own practices. Thus according to this neologism, it is not help
ful to regard the First Amendment as having emplaced a wall separating
the practices of religion from the practices of government, for it is not
walls, but bridges, that the first amendment contemplates.186
A

Van Alstyne's argument is that religiously motivated activists
threaten the secular state, rather than vice-versa. Considered from
this perspective, Professor Carter's thesis that pious citizens are sys-

that, it seems highly unlikely that members of mainstream religious groups face a serious
prospect of being either silenced or ignored.
181. Dowd, supra note 180.
182. Id. This acronym translates to "What would Jesus do?" See id.
183. Id.; see also Dan K. Thomasson, Religion and Politics: A Volatile Mix, SUN
HERALD (Biloxi, MS) , Dec. 28, 1999, at B2 (quoting the author's father as warning him to
"[b]e careful of those who wear their religion on their sleeves or who find the need to certify
themselves as true believers. They can be dangerous to the rest of us").
184. See WENDY KAMINER, SLEEPING WITH EXTRA-TERRESTRIALS:
lRRATIONALISM AND TiiE PERILS OF PIETY (1999).

THE RISE OF

185. See Angie Cannon, Civics or Religion?: Commandments Clash, U.S. NEWS &
2000, at 36 (describing various legislative proposals for posting the
Ten Co=andments in public schools and other public buildings).

WORLD REP., Feb. 28,

186. Van Alstyne, supra note 134, at 771.
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temically ignored or disempowered, represents a disconnect from con
temporary political realities - at least insofar as traditional (or
"mainstream") denominations are concerned.

IV. THE COMPELLING CASE FOR ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUSLY
MOTIVATED DISSENT AIMED AT SECURING GREATER
REsPECT FOR CULTURAL PLURALISM
Professor Carter essentially describes two fundamentally different
kinds of dissent associated with religious minorities. Religious minori
ties sometimes enter general public policy debates in an attempt to en
sure that the civil code reflects their subjective religious commitments.
In many respects, religious minorities engaged in protest against abor
tion rights or gay rights fit this profile. Throughout much of The
Dissent of the Governed, Professor Carter expressly embraces this
kind of dissent aimed at recreating the general community, comprised
of both believers and non-believers, in a religious community's own
image (pp. 89-95).
On the other hand, Professor Carter correctly posits that members
of religious communities voluntarily submit to an authority wholly in
dependent of the secular state. "[S]elf-constituted communities of
meaning, unlike the Constitution-bound political sovereigns, may cen
sor both the words and acts of their members" (p. 87). In creating
self-constituted communities of meaning, religious organizations re
quire the ability to make and enforce demands of their adherents. "A
community that is unable to adopt and enforce its own vision of harm,
based on its own epistemology, quickly ceases to be a community that
can engage effectively in acts of self-definition" (p. 89). Here, Carter
is not talking about religious minorities imposing their views on the
general community, but rather enjoying some measure of self
definition within their own self-constituted communities, communities
that exist within the larger, general community. This is a huge distinc
tion.
Professor Carter attempts to claim the same First Amendment
status for both kinds of religiously motivated dissent (pp. 89-99). Nev
ertheless, arguments in favor of creating legal breathing room for re
ligious minorities stand on a very different footing than his pleas for
the general community to consider seriously dissent aimed at estab
lishing a theocracy. Dissent in the service of securing legislation ac
commodating religious practice does not represent an attempt to hi
jack the institutions of the civil state in the service of jihad or pose any
serious threat to the maintenance of a pluralistic democracy (pp. 12230). Both kinds of dissent register disagreement with the policies of
the general community, but it seems to me that the general community
ought to treat quite differently offensive and defensive species of re
ligiously motivated dissent.
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When a religious minority group complains that a general law un
duly burdens the ability of its members to meet their obligations of
conscience, the community has an obligation to listen. By stipulation,
discrete religious minorities are unlikely to enjoy broad representation
within democratically elected state legislatures or in the federal Con
gress. Accordingly, the effects of general laws on discrete religious
communities might well fail to register on the political radar screen
when a legislative body enacts a general proscription against a par
ticular behavior or an administrative agency enacts a rule regulating a
particular kind of behavior.187
The Supreme Court has refused to interpret the Free Exercise
Clause as excusing members of religious minorities from compliance
with general laws.188 Thus, the ability of religious minorities to obtain
exemptions from highly burdensome laws is entirely contingent on
their ability to make their case to the general community in an attempt
to build a coalition of support for legislatively modifying the general
rule that impedes their ability to practice their faith. 189 In this sense,
then, an appeal to the body politic constitutes the only potential route
of securing effective relief from general, but highly burdensome, laws
affecting the ability of a given religion's adherents to practice their
faith in deed as well as word.190
187. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
see also Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting, but not

deciding, that the effect of laws on fundamental liberties, such as freedom of speech and on
"discrete and insular minorities" might require a "more searching judicial inquiry" especially
if the law at issue might "tendO seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities"); ELY, supra note 120, at 73-88, 93-94,
101-16, 135-79 (arguing that the federal courts should carefully consider the effect of their
decisions on racial and cultural minorities and should, to the extent feasible, construe consti
tutional text to further the process of "representation reinforcement" (i.e., enhance the rela
tive political voice of permanent racial and cultural minorities within the political commu
nity)).
188. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
189. Of course, if a legislative body enacted a facially neutral general law, but harbored
animus toward a particular religious group when enacting the law, such that the law's real
purpose was to burden the religious community, the Free Exercise Clause would provide a
source of relief. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993). Undoubtedly, some general laws are the product of religiously motivated animus or
hatred; most, however, are not. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the most bur
densome laws to a given religion necessarily will be laws enacted in an effort to burden the
group. Thus, benign neglect can be just as deadly to religious minorities as intentional dis
crimination. Indeed, because instances of benign neglect will not support a free exercise
claim under the ruling in Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, they constitute a much more important
impediment to the existence of self-defining religious communities.
190. See generally Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 209, 212-17 (1994); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. Cf. REV. 1, 7-10, 30-39, 41-59; William W. Van
Alstyne, The Failure ofthe Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Four
teenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 304-06 (1996); Eugene Volokh, A Common Law
Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1481-89 (1999).
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Before the community denies a religious community the ability to
observe the dictates of the members' collective consciences, it ought to
afford the members a fair hearing. When a religious community seeks
to establish a system of voluntary rules for its own governance, the
community's rules might well run afoul of existing general laws.191
Perhaps the best recent example involves the Native American
Church's practice of ingesting peyote incident to a sacred rite. Many
jurisdiCtions - not to mention the federal government - classed pe
yote as an addictive, anti-social drug worthy of complete proscription.
The facts are a great deal more complicated: peyote is not particularly
addictive; it happens to be a powerful emetic, limiting its intrinsic ap
peal to a general audience; no general street traffic in peyote exists;
and the use of peyote is integral to the religious rites of the Native
American Church.192
On these facts, the case for prohibiting the Native American
Church's members from ingesting peyote is incredibly weak. Apply
ing a general policy against the use of psychotropic drugs for recrea
tional purposes simply does not make sense in these circumstances,
unless the general society is committed to enforcing its notions of mo
rality on a discrete and insular religious minority simply because it has
the raw power to do so. Over time, most jurisdictions have enacted
legislation abandoning their prohibitions against peyote, at least if
used incident to religious rites by the Native American Church.193 A
dialogue about the necessity of applying general anti-drug laws and
policies to peyote facilitated a reasonable accommodation of a relig
ious minority. This is the First Amendment at its best. Moreover, if
Professor Carter is correct to suppose that "repeated injuries" will be
met at some point with armed resistance (perhaps justifiably), it is far
better to engage in a dialogue jn the hopes of reaching an arrangement
that meets the needs of both the general community and the religious
minority.

191. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding against a free
exercise claim, an Air Force regulation prohibiting non-uniform headgear, including yar
mulkes); Volokh, supra note 190, at 1483-84 (describing how general laws against carrying
weapons in public, arguably preclude Sikhs from wearing religiously mandated ceremonial
daggers, or kirpans, and the potential application of zoning laws to prohibit a religious group
from meeting in a private'home located in a residential area); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate
Questions ofReligious Exemptions - A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 595, 655-56 (1999) (describing the potential effects of ordinary and seemingly reason
able government decisions on persons with nondominant cultural or religious obligations).
But cf. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the then-valid
Religious Freedoms Restoration Act and holding that Sikh school children may wear kir
pans to school, subject to some elementary safety concerns).
192. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History ofEmployment Divi
sion v. Stnith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 963, 983 (1998) [hereinafter Epps, Unknown God];
Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. LJ.
563, 579-80 (1998) [hereinafter Epps, Free Exercise].
193. See Epps, Unknown God, supra note 192, at 999.
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In this sense, then, Professor Carter's call for the general commu
nity to respect religious dissenters and engage in dialogue with them
makes a great deal of sense. When religious minorities are seeking to
preserve their very existence - rather than attempting to impose par
ticular theistic commitments on the general community - they must
be heard. Of course, it probably would be asking too much of gov
ernment to create a First Amendment jurisprudence that drew a line
between religious speech seeking accommodation and religious speech
seeking to establish theocracy. And, as Professor Carter notes, relig
ious communities engage in speech aimed at both objectives.
The only plausible response is to afford all religious dissent a seri
ous hearing. When the object of the dissent is a heartfelt desire to im
pose a theocratically inspired rule on the general community, a polite
"thanks but no thanks" is all the response that religious minorities can
rightly demand. Just as a Jehovah's Witness has no general right to
occupy a private individual's living room, religious communities have
no general right to hijack the institutions and agencies of the civil state
in order to implement a particular version of God's will. As the
maxim teaches, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. No
matter how well-intentioned, overtly religiously inspired, general
community regulations raise very serious problems in a pluralistic so
ciety.
On the other hand, when religionists seek an accommodation to
preserve their very existence or identity, the community should be put
to the task that Professor Carter proposes: in these circumstances, the
community should be required to offer reasons in support of the appli
cation of the general rule to the religious community. Make no mis
take, this is not an argument about some absolute right of the religious
community to an exemption from a generally applicable law. Instead,
it is an argument that religious communities deserve reasons from
their fellow citizens when law severs the ability of a believer to put
faith into action.
It is, of course, far easier "to say, simply, Do this - and have it
done, like the servants of the centurion in the Gospel parable" (p. 99).
As Professor Carter cautions, "[t]hat is the sense in which power tends
to corrupt, even in a democracy: when one possesses power for too
long, law becomes less the glue that knits us together than the name
that we give to the conclusions for which we would rather not offer ar
guments" (p. 99). Carter rightly denominates as a dangerous form of
"fundamentalism" a system in which "law need not be explained as
long as it is spelled out (inerrantly) and obeyed (unquestioningly), for
we know it to be right" (p. 99). Thus, when a law denies conscience
the freedom to act and the community refuses to give reasons for
maintaining the law, religious minorities have a legitimate objection to
the community's insensitive behavior. Given the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to balance the claims of religious minorities against the
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ability of the general community to write and enforce general rules, it
is all the more essential that the body politic take seriously religious
dissent.
V.

CONCLUSION: HEARING (DIS)HARMONIES IN THE
CHORUS OF DISSENT

There is a kind of negative synergy between Professor Shiffrin' s
and Professor Carter's dissent-based theories of free speech. Profes
sor Shiffrin conceives of a dissent-based theory of free speech as en
hancing the relative voice of cultural minorities to achieve a more just
state. This project probably does not include laws criminalizing abor
tion and homosexual sodomy, much less laws imposing other relig
iously inspired limitations on personal autonomy (particularly when
these rules further marginalize already marginalized cultural minori
ties). Nevertheless, a dissent-based theory of the First Amendment
should create as much possibility for reactionary change as it does for
progressive change. Thus, free speech critics are probably correct to
suppose that the free speech principle is not necessarily conducive to
achieving their social agenda.
Professor Shiffrin's effort to translate the free speech principle into
a device that empowers minorities fighting for progressive causes
seems unlikely to work. To the extent that dissent protects the reac
tionary or racist speaker as much as the progressive speaker, it con
ceivably does more harm than good to the project of securing progres
sive change.
Indeed, Professor Carter's vision of dissent would
empower those working in direct opposition to many of the causes
that Professor Shiffrin appears to hold dear. Thus, if winning is the
most important objective, mainland China's approach to dissent seems
more likely to prove successful than a serious commitment to free and
open debate about matters of public concem.194
Similarly, Professor Shiffrin's theory of dissent in the service of
progressive change serves as a powerful proof of Professor Carter's
basic complaint: religious minorities are being denied their full meas
ure of participation in the project of democratic deliberation. To the
extent that religious minorities position themselves in opposition to
progressive understandings on issues of race, gender, and sexual orien
tation, they increasingly face the prospect of being silenced by gov
ernment officials who have come to embrace the progressives' value
structure.

194. See supra note 32; see also Charles Fried, Diversity: From Left to Far Left, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2000, at A19 (describing the Association of American Law School's refusal to
facilitate joint programs with the Federalist Society, the National Association of Scholars,
and the Christian Law Society, all conservative organizations, while cosponsoring events at
its annual meeting with the Society of American Law Teachers ("SALT"), a left-leaning or
ganization).
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Professor Shiffrin plainly believes that dissent not only creates the
possibility of dialogue, but also facilitates change, citing the civil rights
movement as an example of how dissent can forge new understandings
of justice. If one were to implement fully Professor Carter's vision of
dissent, undoubtedly religious dissenters would prevail more often in
securing legislative changes that implement their religiously inspired
ideals of good governance. That said, Professor Carter's vision is pal
atable only to the extent that the "dialogue" does not simply exchange
one group of oppressed and alienated persons for another (i.e., relig
ious conservatives for women or sexual minorities).
Shiffrin's confidence in the ability of dissent to promote change
raises serious questions about the potential effects of fully embracing
Carter's proposal for requiring the secular state to justify on the merits
every law or policy religious dissenters oppose. Given that dissent
provokes change, this sort of "dialogue" undoubtedly would portend
mixed results for women, racial minorities, and gays and lesbians, all
groups that historically have supported the kinds of "progressive" so
cial policies often opposed by religious fundamentalists.
This, of course, is not an argument for silencing religious funda
mentalists. It is, perhaps, an argument that legitimates a response that
simply rejects the religious premise of the fundamentalist dissenters;
whereas Carter would have the defenders of the secular state justify
existing policies on secular grounds in the face of religious opposition,
there is no reason that other members of the community (but not the
state itself) should not simply reject the religious premises underlying
the objections. The state, of course, can itself neither maintain nor
suppress particular theological commitments, but all citizens are free
to follow the dictates of their conscience, at least with respect to mat
ters of belief. Given the potential effectiveness of dissent in moving
public policy, those opposed to one religious tradition should be free
to argue against proposed changes in terms that are either secular or
religious. Moreover, if religious dissenters lose this debate, it hardly
justifies making war against the state.
In sum, a meaningful commitment to dissent is a kind of social wa
ger, an experiment that guarantees a process, but does not prefigure
any outcomes.195 Considering the potential effect of a particular the-

195. In the immortal words of Justice Holmes:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to be
lieve even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ulti
mate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not
every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowl
edge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.
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ory of freedom of expression on dissent provides an excellent means
of analyzing the plausibility of the theory; a free speech theory that
fails adequately to protect dissent should be highly suspect. Of course,
it is one thing to evaluate free speech theories according to how dis
sent would fare; it is entirely another to posit dissent as the sum and
substance of the Free Speech Clause. For the reasons set forth in this
Review, a dissent-based theory of free speech presents very serious
problems, at least insofar as one wishes to· maintain viewpoint neu
trality as a central component of the free speech project.
On the other hand, notwithstanding the definitional and opera
tional difficulties, securing the protection of political speech of a "dis
senting" cast has to be an important, indeed essential, objective of any
plausible theory of free speech. As Professor Vincent Blasi has ex
plained, "the overriding objective at all times should be to equip the
first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods
when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when
governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent systemati
cally."196 How best to achieve this objective, both jurisprudentially
and doctrinally, remains elusive. Although Blasi may be correct to
suppose that "[i]t is doubtful that legal standards could ever be de
signed with sufficient prescience and precision"197 to constrain effec
tively the lower federal courts' discretion when faced with difficult
free speech cases, a system that openly invites entirely intuitive or ad
hoc decisions about the relative value of speech activity surely pres
ents a greater threat to project of democratic deliberation.198 Because
the threat to free speech principles is likely to be most acute in times
when the value of dissent is potentially at its highest,199 an ideal test

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
196. Blasi, supra note 23, at 449-50.
197. Id. at 467.
198. Indeed, Professor Blasi seems to recognize this:

·

Courts working within a first amendment tradition that authorized judicial inquiry into mo
tivation, impact, and form would be tempted in pathological periods to find something dis
tinctive in the speech of the most unpopular dissenters (concerted or surreptitious conduct,
indoctrination, nihilistic motivation, coercive or selective impact) that would place it outside
the ambit of first amendment protection. An expansive tradition regarding the reach of the
first amendment would make it more difficult for judges to invoke such characteristics as a
basis for suppressing speech.

Id. at 477-78. Justice Hugo Black, of course, strongly endorsed the utility of strict tests and
bright lines, believing such tests essential to prevent judicial backsliding. See Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U, L. REV. 865, 866-67, 874-76, 880-81 (1960); see also Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and
First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 552-55, 557-59
(1962); Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
UCLA L. REV. 428, 441-53 (1967).

199. See id. at 485 ("Any ad hoc assessment of the benefits and costs of speech that is
rnade during pathological times is bound to be tilted in the direction of regulation; that is an
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would therefore safeguard dissent even when the social or political
consequences of doing so might well be uncertain.200
At least arguably, Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory does not take
seriously enough the problem of enforcement through personnel se
lected by majoritarian representatives - personnel who presumably
would share the attitudes, values, and prejudices of the dominant
groups within the community. Conversely, Professor Carter's basic
objection is that cultural elites already ignore or silence the speech of
·

religiously motivated dissenters. Neither Professor Shiffrin nor Pro
fessor Carter offers up a comprehensive and potentially effective pro
gram of reform - a prescription that would ensure that dissent re
mains an important component of the process of democratic
deliberation. That said, both authors significantly advance the debate
and bring a much needed renewed focus on centrality of dissent to the
free speech project.
Almost any free speech theory is likely to engender immediate
objections - objections that, as often as not, will lead to various
"clarifications" or "amendments." The author, thus, gradually refines
the theory to include speech that she believes should enjoy constitu
tional protection (but arguably does not under the initial articulation
of the theory).201 Over three decades ago, Professor Harry Kalven
suggested that a commitment to permitting free (even if factually inac
curate) commentary on the government constituted the "central
meaning" of the Free Speech Clause.202 To be sure, this is a plausible
theory. On the other hand, myriad alternate theories exist, and it
would be difficult - if not impossible - to devise a single animating
purpose that adequately would encompass all the reasons why citizens
should view free speech as an essential right in a pluralistic, participa
tory democracy. Accordingly, discovering the "central meaning" of
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause almost certainly will re
main a work in progress, and attempts to limit attention to a single as
pect of the free speech project are likely to do more harm than good.

inevitable consequence of the shift in attitudes regarding the desirability of free speech that
characterizes such periods.").
200. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); but
cf. Blasi, S11pra note 23, at 507-09 (describing the failure of the federal courts to afford strong

protection to dissenters in periods of perceived national crisis).
201. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment, supra note 9, at 256-57 (modifying the
"democratic deliberation" theory of free speech to reach the arts and literature because an
educated population is necessary to sustain self-government). Of course, many would argue
that the arts and literature have value independent of the role they play (if any) in facilitat
ing self-government. Moreover, as Professor Robert Post has noted, Meiklejohn's original
thesis also fails to incorporate the importance of autonomy values to free speech theory. See
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL
MANAGEMENT 268-76, 282-89 (1995).

202. See Kalven, supra note 7, at 204-21.

DOMAINS:

DEMOCRACY,

COMMUNITY,
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Professors Shiffrin and Carter have provided rich commentaries on
the centrality of dissent to free speech theory and jurisprudence - al
beit from different ideological perspectives. Their books are impor
tant contributions to the ongoing dialogue about the First Amend
ment. That said, I do not think that either has succeeded in ending the
quest for the central meaning of the First Amendment. Nor is this, in
any meaningful way, a bad thing. The journey - the search for the
ultimate answer - can sometimes be more important than attaining
the object of the quest. It seems fitting to conclude with another cau
tionary note from Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men. . . . Ultimate futility of such attempts to
compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort, from the Roman
drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the In
quisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles
as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our pres
ent totalitarian enemies . . . . It seems trite but necessary to say that the
First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends
203
by avoiding these beginnings.

203. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943).

